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WARNING:  SHIFTING LIABILITY 
TO MANUFACTURERS OF BRAND-NAME 
MEDICINES WHEN THE HARM WAS 
ALLEGEDLY CAUSED BY GENERIC DRUGS 
HAS SEVERE SIDE EFFECTS 
Victor E. Schwartz,* Phil Goldberg** & Cary Silverman*** 
 
Can a product manufacturer be subject to liability for a competitor’s 
product? American tort law has always said, “No.” It does not matter if the 
products are identical. Companies are not to be their competitors’ keepers. 
Nevertheless, over the past few years, three courts have overturned this 
fundamental of tort law, holding that a manufacturer of a brand-name 
prescription drug can be subject to liability even when a plaintiff alleges 
that he or she was harmed by a generic drug made by the brand-name 
manufacturer’s competitor.  Most courts, including four federal courts of 
appeal and dozens of federal district and state trial courts, have rejected 
this expansion of tort law. 
This debate has intensified since 2011, when the Supreme Court of the 
United States held that all duty to warn claims against manufacturers of 
generic drugs are preempted by federal drug.  The personal injury bar is 
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hoping that courts will give competitor liability theories a new look, 
particularly when courts find that there is no other path for users of generic 
drugs to sue. 
This Article explains the reasons courts should continue resisting any 
temptation to change state tort law to allow for competitor liability:  (1) it 
is driven by a search for pockets for paying claims in violation of 
fundamental tort law principles; (2) the overwhelming majority of courts 
have continued rejecting competitor liability, even since the Supreme Court 
ruling; and (3) shifting liability to manufacturers of brand-name drugs 
could have significant adverse legal and health care consequences. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Can a business be subject to liability for a competitor’s product?  Say you 
own a restaurant and a woman gets ill from eating at a restaurant down the 
block serving food with the same exact recipe as your own.  In fact, they 
copied your recipe.  Can she successfully sue your restaurant for her harm?  
What if you are a car manufacturer, and a man buys a sports car from a 
foreign competitor who copied your product?  If the car crashes because of 
an alleged defect in the car, can he successfully sue your company?  
American tort law has always said, “No.”  Companies are not their 
competitors’ keepers; Peter does not pay for the alleged sins of Paul. 
A few years ago, though, a California appellate court1 followed by a 
federal district court “Erie guessing” at Vermont law2 broke with this 
fundamental principle.  They subjected manufacturers of brand-name 
pharmaceuticals to liability, even though the plaintiffs in those lawsuits 
were alleging that they were injured by generic versions of thos drugs.  The 
courts reasoned that even though the plaintiffs took only generic drugs, the 
generics were required to use the same warning labels developed for the 
brand-name drugs.3  These courts also based their conclusions on the 
assumption that physicians may write prescriptions filled by generic drugs 
based on the safety and efficacy representations that the brand-name drugs’ 
manufacturers made about the brand-name drug in the Physicians’ Desk 
Reference and other materials.4 
Most courts have rejected this end run around traditional product liability 
law.  These courts now include the Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, and Eighth Circuits, 
as well as dozens of federal district and state trial courts.  They have 
properly held that a pharmaceutical manufacturer, as with any other 
company, can be subject to liability only for products it manufactured or 
sold.  As they have explained, brand-name manufacturers, in their materials 
 
 1. See Conte v. Wyeth, Inc., 85 Cal. Rptr. 3d 299 (Cal. Ct. App. 2008). 
 2. See Kellogg v. Wyeth, 762 F. Supp. 2d 694 (D. Vt. 2010). 
 3. See Conte, 85 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 307. 
 4. See id. at 313; see also Kellogg, 762 F. Supp. 2d. at 705. 
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and labeling, are referencing the safety and efficacy of only their own drugs, 
not the generic forms of their drugs. 
Nevertheless, optimism has arisen among innovative personal injury 
lawyers that competitor liability for brand-name pharmaceutical companies 
will gain new momentum in light of the tension between two U.S. Supreme 
Court rulings.  In a little noticed 2011 case, the Supreme Court created 
different liability laws for users of brand-name and generic drugs.  In this 
case, PLIVA, Inc. v. Mensing,5 the Court determined that federal labeling 
law for generic drugs preempts a failure-to-warn claim brought by someone 
claiming that the manufacturer of the generic drug did not adequately 
disclose the risk of taking its drug.6  In 2009, though, the Court ruled in 
Wyeth v. Levine7 that individuals can, in most cases, proceed with such 
failure-to-warn claims against manufacturers of brand-name medications.8 
The plaintiffs’ bar’s hope is that judges will succumb to allowing an 
aggrieved user of generic drugs to sue the brand-name manufacturer when 
there is no other path for recovery against the generic drug’s manufacturer, 
or as a shortcut to a perceived deep pocket.  The initial reaction from the 
lower courts, including two federal courts of appeal, has largely been the 
right one:  to faithfully apply traditional product liability and tort law, even 
if doing so leads to results they believe are inequitable for some plaintiffs 
and defendants in their courtrooms.9  The only court to hold otherwise has 
been the Supreme Court of Alabama.10 
This Article explains the reasons courts should continue resisting any 
temptation to change their state’s tort law to allow for competitor liability, 
Mensing notwithstanding.  In Mensing, the Supreme Court fully appreciated 
that “finding pre-emption [in Mensing] but not in Wyeth makes little 
[practical] sense,”11 but concluded that altering this system rests solely with 
the legislative and executive branches, saying that Congress and the Food & 
Drug Administration (FDA) can “change the law and regulations if they so 
desire.”12 
This Article discusses the divergent regulatory regimes for brand-name 
and generic drugs that laid the basis for the Supreme Court rulings and the 
novel theories at the heart of the three rulings allowing competitor liability.  
It then explains the reasons courts should not adopt competitor liability 
under fundamental principles of state tort law, and why they should instead 
yield to Congress to address any inequities from the Supreme Court cases. 
 
 5. 131 S. Ct. 2567 (2011). 
 6. Id. at 2572. 
 7. 555 U.S. 555 (2009). 
 8. See id. at 581. 
 9. See infra Parts II, III.C. 
 10. See Wyeth, Inc. v Weeks, 2013 WL 135753 (Ala. Jan. 11, 2013). 
 11. Mensing, 131 S. Ct. at 2581 (explaining that had the plaintiffs taken “the brand-name 
drug prescribed by their doctors, Wyeth would control and their lawsuits would not be pre-
empted.  But because pharmacists, acting in full accord with state law, substituted [a generic 
drug] instead, federal law pre-empts these lawsuits”). 
 12. Id. at 2582. 
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I.  THE SEPARATE TREATMENT AND THE RISE OF GENERIC DRUGS 
In the early twentieth century, consumers had vastly different perceptions 
of generic and brand-name drugs; they had broad concerns that generic 
drugs could be counterfeit or have wide variations in quality from their 
brand-name counterparts.13  This view of generic drugs began to change in 
1962, when Congress tightened regulatory oversight of prescription drugs 
and subjected generic drugs to the same lengthy, complex pre-market 
approval process applicable to brand-name drugs.14  The legitimacy of 
generic drugs was enhanced, but few manufacturers developed them given 
the expense of investing in the type of clinical trials needed for new drug 
approval.15  As late as the 1970s, the generic drug market was largely 
limited to antibiotics.16 
In the early 1980s, only about one-third of top-selling drugs with expired 
patents—excluding antibiotics and drugs approved before 1962—had 
generic versions available.17  When available, the market share for the 
generic versions of these top-selling drugs averaged just 12.7 percent of 
prescriptions dispensed through retail pharmacies.18 
A.  Separate Approval Processes for Brand-Name and Generic Drugs 
The modern era for prescription generic drugs began in 1984 when 
Congress enacted the Drug Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration 
Act, widely referred to as the Hatch-Waxman Amendments to the Food, 
Drug and Cosmetic Act (FDCA).19  This law provided a simpler, less 
demanding, and faster process for approval of generic drugs that can begin 
 
 13. See infra Part I.C. 
 14. See Drug Amendments of 1962, Pub. L. No. 87-781, 76 Stat. 780 (1962) (codified as 
amended at 21 U.S.C. §§ 301–381 (2006)) (known as the Kefauver-Harris Amendments); 
United States v. Generix Drug Corp., 460 U.S. 453, 461 (1983) (holding that a generic 
version of a drug approved after 1962 constituted a new drug under the Federal Food, Drug, 
and Cosmetics Act). 
 15. Teresa J. Lechner-Fish, Comment, The Hatch-Waxman System:  Suffering a Plague 
of Bad Behavior, 5 HOUSTON BUS. & TAX L.J. 372, 387 (2005) (noting that, by 1984, only 
fifteen new drug approvals for post-1962 generic products existed in the market for 150 
drugs with expired patents (citing Gerald J. Mossinghoff, Overview of the Hatch-Waxman 
Act and Its Impact on the Drug Development Process, 54 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 187, 187 
(1999))). 
 16. See CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, HOW INCREASED COMPETITION FROM GENERIC DRUGS 
HAS AFFECTED PRICES AND RETURNS IN THE PHARMACEUTICAL INDUSTRY 29 (1998), 
available at http://www.cbo.gov/ftpdocs/6xx/doc655/pharm.pdf. 
 17. Id. 
 18. Id. 
 19. Drug Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-
417, 98 Stat. 1585 (codified as amended at 21 U.S.C. § 355(j) (2006) and 35 U.S.C. §§ 156, 
271(e) (2006)); see also Abbreviated New Drug Application Regulations, 57 Fed. Reg. 
17,950, 17,951 (Apr. 28, 1992) (describing the Hatch-Waxman Amendments).  The 
abbreviated new drug approval (ANDA) process provides applicants with four certification 
routes when filing an application:  (1) that the drug has not been patented; (2) that the patent 
has expired; (3) the date on which the patent will expire, and that the generic drug will not 
go on the market until that date passes; and (4) that the patent is not infringed or is invalid. 
See 21 U.S.C. § 355(b)(2)(A)(i)–(iv); 21 C.F.R. § 314.94(a)(12)(i)(A) (2012). 
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before an innovator drug loses its patent protection.20  It decreased the 
average time between patent expiration and generic entry from three or four 
years to less than three months.21  In return, the Act extended patent 
protection for the products of brand-name drug manufacturers to account 
for the time spent in the FDA’s rigorous approval process.22  The goal was 
to give brand-name drug manufacturers more time to try to recoup their 
investment in successful drugs, which could compensate for the many other 
drugs that never reach the market, are not profitable, or are ultimately 
replaced by generics. 
1.  New Drug Approval Process for Brand-Name Drugs 
The New Drug Approval (NDA) process for brand-name drugs subjects 
all new prescription drugs to formal review so that the FDA can understand 
and carefully balance the risks and benefits of each prescription drug.  Only 
drugs whose design, when accompanied with proper warnings, is safe and 
effective for public use are approved.23 
A manufacturer of a brand-name drug begins the approval process by 
submitting an “Investigational New Drug” (IND) application to the FDA, 
which permits clinical (human) testing.24  The FDA uses its considerable 
scientific expertise to review the application and animal testing conducted 
with the proposed drug.25  Only after the FDA approves the IND can a 
company use the drug in tightly controlled tests with patients, who agree to 
participate in the experimental drug program, so that it can gather data on 
the drug’s clinical safety and efficacy.26  The manufacturer then works with 
physicians to put the brand-name drug through trial phases with varying 
controls, supervision, patient populations, and goals.27 
 
 20. See CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, supra note 16, at 3–4. 
 21. See id. at 28; Gerald J. Mossinghoff, Overview of the Hatch-Waxman Act and Its 
Impact on the Drug Development Process, 54 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 187, 187 (1999) (observing 
that Hatch-Waxman was not a “good deal [for the research-based pharmaceutical industry], 
unless one believed that FDA was going to go forward with its plans to implement 
abbreviated new drug applications (ANDAs) through regulation”). 
 22. See Mossinghoff, supra note 21, at 188–89 (discussing the legislative history of the 
Act).  The patent term of drugs manufactured in the United States is the greater of twenty 
years from the time of filing or seventeen years from the grant of the patent. 35 U.S.C. 
§ 154.  Hatch-Waxman allows manufacturers to obtain an extension equal to one-half the 
investigational new drug (IND) period, described infra, plus the period of new drug approval 
(NDA) review, but the extension can be no greater than five years and total market 
exclusivity cannot be more than fourteen years. See id. § 156.  The Act generally guarantees 
five years of exclusivity to NDA holders, as the FDA will not approve an ANDA application 
for a generic drug during that period. See 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(5); 21 C.F.R. § 314.108(b)(2). 
 23. See generally 21 C.F.R. § 314. 
 24. See id. § 312. 
 25. See id. § 312.22. 
 26. See 21 U.S.C. § 355(b)(1); 21 C.F.R.§§ 312.20, 312.21; see also Charles J. Walsh & 
Alyssa Pyrich, Rationalizing the Regulation of Prescription Drugs and Medical Devices:  
Perspectives on Private Certification and Tort Reform, 48 RUTGERS L. REV. 883, 905–07 
(1996) (discussing the three phases of human trials). 
 27. See 21 C.F.R. § 312.21 (describing Phase 1, 2, and 3 trials). 
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Upon conclusion of those tests, the manufacturer files an NDA, detailing 
the chemistry of the drug, clinical data and patient information, its use by 
children, reports of adverse reactions, proposed packaging and labeling, as 
well as any other pertinent manufacturing information.28  An NDA often 
spans thousands of pages and describes the impact of the drug on several 
hundred to several thousand patients.29 
NDA approval requires that the product’s warnings accurately portray the 
drug’s safety profile so that healthcare practitioners can prescribe drugs in 
ways that maximize effectiveness and minimize risk.30  The label must 
include basic information, such as a description of the drug, identity of its 
manufacturer, statement of ingredients, and an expiration date.31  It also 
must provide directions for its intended use in the treatment, prevention, or 
diagnosis of a disease or condition; this information includes any necessary 
preparation, dosage (recommended, usual, and maximum dosage), 
frequency, and duration of use.32  And, it must include a description of any 
situation in which the drug should not be used because the risk would 
clearly outweigh the benefit.33  This may include precautionary information 
regarding any special care needed, such as its use during pregnancy or by 
children.34 
The FDA also requires that prescription drug labels break down 
information about the potential side effects of taking a drug into three 
categories:  (1) “contraindications,” where a patient would be under severe 
risk for taking the drug and should be discouraged from taking it; 
(2) “warnings,” which are serious risks known to occur in some patients; 
and (3) “precautions,” which are risks that arise less frequently.35  The 
manufacturer must provide steps that can be taken in the event of an 
adverse reaction, as well as any dependency concerns, signs and symptoms 
of an overdose, and potential treatments.36  Unless the FDA grants a 
specific waiver, every element of these extensive disclosures must be 
included in a drug’s labeling.37 
In 2006, the FDA amended its regulations to add a new requirement that 
drug labels highlight the most important prescribing information, including 
concise summaries of the most significant contraindications, warnings, and 
 
 28. See 21 U.S.C. § 355(b); 21 C.F.R. § 314.50 (providing the required content and 
format of an NDA); id. § 314.55 (requiring an assessment of safety and effectiveness in 
pediatric subpopulations). 
 29. See Grundberg v. Upjohn Co., 813 P.2d 89, 96 (Utah 1991) (describing the NDA 
process). 
 30. See Requirements on Content and Format of Labeling for Human Prescription Drug 
and Biological Products, 71 Fed. Reg. 3922 (Jan. 24, 2006) (codified at 21 C.F.R. §§ 201, 
314, and 601). 
 31. See 21 C.F.R. §§ 201.1, 201.10, 201.17, 201.50, 201.51. 
 32. See id. §§ 201.5, 201.55, 201.57. 
 33. See id. § 201.57. 
 34. See id. 
 35. Id. § 201.57(a)(5)–(6). 
 36. Id. § 201.57. 
 37. Id. § 201.58. 
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precautions, and the most frequently occurring adverse reactions.38  To 
approve a new drug, the FDA must find “that the drug meets the statutory 
standards for safety and effectiveness, manufacturing and controls, and 
labeling.”39  For successful drugs, the NDA process is completed when the 
Division or Office Director signs an approval action letter allowing the 
manufacturer to market the drug.40 
All told, the average process for successfully bringing a drug to market 
takes more than a decade.41  The industry association representing 
manufacturers of brand-name drugs estimates the R&D cost of bringing a 
single new drug to market at $1.2 billion.42  Most drug products are never 
approved for patient use, resulting in significant sunk investment costs.  In 
fact, less than one-in-ten products submitted to the agency receive approval 
and enter the marketplace.43  Researchers also abandon development of 
many other potential medicines before filing with the FDA.44  The 
considerable time and expense of bringing a drug to market, from 
development to approval, is the reason for extended patent exclusivity and a 
major factor in the pricing of brand-name drugs. 
2.  Abbreviated New Drug Application Process for Generic Drugs 
The generic drug application process, called the Abbreviated New Drug 
Application (ANDA), is completely different.  Unlike the innovator 
manufacturer, generic drug manufacturers are no longer required to include 
preclinical (animal) and clinical (human) data to establish safety and 
effectiveness.45  The FDA only requires a generic drug applicant that uses 
 
 38. See Requirements on Content and Format of Labeling for Human Prescription Drug 
and Biological Products, 71 Fed. Reg. 3922 (Jan. 24, 2006) (codified at 21 C.F.R. §§ 201, 
314, and 601). 
 39. 21 C.F.R. § 314.105(c). 
 40. The FDA must approve or reject an NDA within 180 days of filing. 21 U.S.C. 
§ 355(c)(1) (2006); 21 C.F.R. § 314.100(a).  Products that treat life threatening conditions 
may be eligible for accelerated approval. See 21 C.F.R. § 314.500. 
 41. Joseph A. DiMasi, Ronald W. Hansen & Henry G. Grabowski, The Price of 
Innovation:  New Estimates of Drug Development Costs, 22 J. HEALTH ECON. 151, 166 
(2003).  The estimated median approval time for standard and priority applications in fiscal 
year 2010 were 10.1 months and 7.9 months, respectively, approximately half the length of a 
decade ago.  FDA, FY 2011 PERFORMANCE REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT AND CONGRESS FOR 
THE PROSCRIPTION DRUG USER FEE ACT 4 (2011), available at http://www.FDA.gov/
downloads/AboutFDA/ReportsManualsForms/Reports/UserFeeReports/PerformanceReports
/PDUFA/UCM294101.pdf.  In practice, these time frames are much longer because the FDA 
does not consider an application “filed” until it includes all the information sought by 
regulators. See id. at A-14. 
 42. PHRMA, NEW DRUG APPROVALS IN 2010, at 12 (2011), available at http://www.
phrma.org/sites/default/files/422/newdrugapprovalsin2010.pdf. 
 43. See Lester M. Crawford, Acting Comm’r of FDA, Speech Before the Mayo Alliance 
for Clinical Trials Conference (Aug. 26, 2004), available at http://www.FDA.gov/
NewsEvents/Speeches/ucm053373.htm (noting an 8 percent success rate for candidate drugs 
entering Phase 1 trials and a 50 percent failure rate among products in late-stage Phase 3 
trials). 
 44. See generally DiMasi et al., supra note 41. 
 45. See 21 U.S.C. § 355(i)(1)(A). 
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the ANDA process to scientifically demonstrate that its product is 
“equivalent” to the pioneer drug.46 
It is often believed that a generic drug is the exact same as its brand-name 
counterpart, but this is not necessarily the case.  The standard for a generic 
drug is to be “therapeutically equivalent” to the brand-name drug, meaning 
that it is both a pharmaceutical equivalent and bioequivalent of the original 
product.47  Pharmaceutical equivalence requires “sameness” in the generic 
drug’s active ingredients, route of administration, dosage, form, and 
strength.48  The FDA allows manufacturers of generic drugs, though, to use 
different “inert” or “inactive” ingredients, such as release mechanisms, 
binders, and preservatives.49 
Manufacturers of generic drugs demonstrate bioequivalence through 
testing a generic drug on a small sample of patients to show that there are 
no significant differences from the already-approved brand-name drug in 
the rate and extent that the active ingredients are absorbed into the 
bloodstream.50  Often, such tests may involve as few as twenty-four to 
thirty-six individuals.51  To be approved, a generic drug applicant must 
show that its version of the drug is bioequivalent to the brand-name drug—
namely, that it has a rate and extent of absorption that is 80 percent to 125 
percent of the rate and extent of absorption of the brand-name drug.52  
Because they are bioequivalent, generic drugs generally, but not always, 
induce reactions in patients that are similar to the brand-name innovators.53 
Manufacturers of brand-name drugs also do not have separate 
responsibilities for writing labeling information for their drug.  Federal law 
mandates that generic drugs carry labeling that is “the same as” the brand-
name version.54 
 
 46. See id. § 355(j). 
 47. See id. 
 48. See id. § 355(j)(2)(A)(iii), (v). 
 49. See 21 CFR 320.1(c) (2012); see also Drugs@FDA Glossary of Terms, FDA, 
http://www.FDA.gov/Drugs/informationondrugs/ucm079436.htm#G (last updated Feb. 2, 
2012) (defining pharmaceutical equivalents). 
 50. 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(2)(A)(iv), (j)(8). 
 51. Abbreviated New Drug Application (ANDA):  Generics, FDA, http://www.FDA.gov/
Drugs/DevelopmentApprovalProcess/HowDrugsareDevelopedandApproved/Approval
Applications/AbbreviatedNewDrugApplicationANDAGenerics/default.htm (last updated 
Jan. 4, 2013). 
 52. See FDA, APPROVED DRUG PRODUCTS WITH THERAPEUTIC EQUIVALENCE 
EVALUATIONS ix (32d ed. 2012), available at http://www.FDA.gov/ucm/groups/FDAgov-
public/@FDAgov-drugs-gen/documents/document/ucm071436.pdf. 
 53. See Lisa Zamosky, The New Deal with Lipitor; Patients Could Now Get a Generic—
or Stay on the Name-Brand for Less, L.A. TIMES, Jan. 16, 2012, at E1 (citing pharmacologist 
Joe Graedon, cocreator of the consumer health column, the People’s Pharmacy). But see 
Review of Therapeutic Equivalence Generic Bupropion XL 300 mg and Wellbutrin XL 300 
mg, FDA, http://www.FDA.gov/AboutFDA/CentersOffices/OfficeofMedicalProductsand
Tobacco/CDER/ucm153270.htm (last updated Oct. 3, 2012). 
 54. See 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(2)(A)(v), (j)(4)(G); 21 C.F.R. §§ 314.94(a)(8)(iii)–(iv), 
314.127(a)(7). 
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B.  Differences in Postmarket Safety Obligations of Brand-Name and 
Generic Drug Manufacturers 
Federal law also places different postmarket monitoring and safety 
labeling obligations on manufacturers of brand-name and generic 
prescription drugs.  Common to all manufacturers is the obligation to report 
adverse drug reactions, regardless of whether the company or attending 
physician believes that the adverse event is related to the drug.55  
Manufacturers must report “serious and unexpected” adverse drug events 
within fifteen days; lesser suspected harms must be reported quarterly or 
annually, depending on the time since the initial approval.56 
1.  Responsibilities of Brand-Name Manufacturers 
The post-approval responsibilities for brand-name manufacturers (NDA 
holders), as with the initial approval process, focus on the need to learn 
about and adjust the drugs that are new to the market.57  NDA holders must 
submit reports on any new developments in scientific knowledge on the 
drug, which they gain through extensive postmarketing reports, studies in 
scientific literature, and experiences with the drug in the United States and 
other countries.58 
Each year, NDA holders file summary reports with the FDA highlighting 
any “significant new information . . . that might affect the safety, 
effectiveness, or labeling of the drug product” and describes the actions that 
the manufacturer has taken or intends to take as a result of the new 
information.59  Should the situation arise, the FDA can require NDA 
holders to undertake further clinical studies to better understand the adverse 
events that may not have been fully anticipated.60 
Should the NDA holder learn of any “clinically significant hazard,” it 
must revise a drug’s labeling to include appropriate warnings for that 
hazard “as soon as there is reasonable evidence of a causal association with 
a drug.”61  There are two processes for NDA holders to add or strengthen a 
contraindication, warning, precaution, adverse reaction, or safety-related 
dosing and administration instruction.  The manufacturer may seek prior 
approval from the FDA or use the “changes being effected” (CBE) 
procedure through which the manufacturer immediately makes the change 
and provides notification to the FDA.62 
 
 55. See 21 C.F.R. § 314.80(b). 
 56. Id. § 314.80(c). 
 57. See id. § 314.80(b). 
 58. See id. 
 59. See id. § 314.81(b)(2)(i). 
 60. 21 U.S.C. § 355(o)(3) (known as a postmarketing requirement, a type of Phase IV 
study); see also U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GEN., FDA’S 
MONITORING OF POSTMARKETING STUDY COMMITMENTS ii (2006), available at http://oig.hhs. 
gov/oei/reports/oei-01-04-00390.pdf (finding that 48 percent of NDAs approved between 
1990 and 2004 involved at least one postmarketing study commitment). 
 61. 21 C.F.R. § 201.57(c)(6)(i). 
 62. See id. § 314.70. 
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All of these monitoring, reporting, and labeling requirements continue 
after the patent for a drug expires and one or more generic versions of the 
product become available.63 
2.  Limited Reporting Obligations of Generic Drug Manufacturers 
The postmarket obligations placed on generic drug manufacturers, by 
contrast, are solely to maintain adequate records and to submit to the FDA 
reports of adverse events.64  The FDA does not require generic 
manufacturers to affirmatively monitor scientific literature or report 
scientific developments to the agency.65  Most of the adverse effects are 
known by the time generics enter the market. 
Should a generic manufacturer “believe[] that new safety information 
should be added” to its drug’s labeling, it must “provide adequate 
supporting information to FDA, and FDA will determine whether the 
labeling for the generic and listed drug should be revised.”66  Unlike with 
brand-name drugs, the FDA has stated that the CBE process does not apply 
to manufacturers of generic drugs.67  Accordingly, all generic drug 
manufacturers must obtain prior FDA approval before making any safety 
changes to their drug’s labeling.68 
This, in part, is because of the requirement discussed earlier that generic 
drug manufacturers have “the same” labeling as their brand-name 
counterparts.69  If the generic drug’s manufacturer were to change its 
product’s labeling, it would be inconsistent with that of the branded drug.70  
In such a circumstance, the FDA could charge the manufacturer with 
misbranding or even withdraw the manufacturer’s ANDA.71 
This postmarket safety system remains intact even when a brand-name 
manufacturer stops selling a drug and withdraws its NDA.  The FDA moves 
the brand-name drug to the ‘‘Discontinued Drug Product List,” presuming it 
 
 63. See id. §§ 314.3(b), 314.70(c), 314.71(a). 
 64. Id. § 314.98 (limiting postmarketing obligations of generic manufacturers to the 
“reporting and record-keeping” subsections of 21 C.F.R. § 314.80, which governs branded 
manufacturers). 
 65. Id. § 314.80(b).  While the postmarketing surveillance regulation refers to the 
obligations of an “applicant,” such applicants are those covered by 21 C.F.R. §§ 314.50 or 
505(b), which apply only to NDA applicants. 
 66. Abbreviated New Drug Application Regulations, 57 Fed. Reg. 17,950, 17,961 (Apr. 
28, 1992). 
 67. See Brief for the United States As Amicus Curiae Supporting Respondents at 15, 
PLIVA, Inc. v. Mensing, 131 S. Ct. 2567 (2011) (No. 09-1039). 
 68. Abbreviated New Drug Application Regulations, 57 Fed. Reg. at 17,950. 
 69. See 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(4)(G) (2006); 21 C.F.R. § 314.94(a)(8)(iii). 
 70. 21 C.F.R. § 314.150(b)(10). 
 71. See PLIVA, Inc. v. Mensing, 131 S. Ct. 2567, 2576 (2011) (stating that the FDA’s 
position is “if generic drug manufacturers, but not the brand-name manufacturer, sent [Dear 
Health Care Provider] letters, that would inaccurately imply a therapeutic difference between 
the brand and generic drugs and thus could be impermissibly ‘misleading’”). 
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was not removed from the market for reasons of safety or effectiveness,72 
and designates one of the generic drugs as the “reference listed drug” 
(RLD).73  This generic drug becomes the vehicle for future bioequivalence 
studies,74 and its label becomes the model that others in the industry must 
follow.  The RLD holder, though, still cannot change its label without prior 
FDA approval.75  When this happens, the FDA takes the central role of 
determining when a labeling change is needed and advises ANDA 
applicants accordingly.76 
Thus, the regulatory regime for generic drugs, as compared with brand-
name drugs, provides for lower barriers of entry and reduced postmarketing 
obligations.  These dynamics have allowed generic drugs to be priced much 
lower than brand-name drugs, which has given their manufacturers a 
competitive advantage over their brand-name counterparts. 
C.  State Generic Substitution Laws and the Dramatic Increased 
Use of Generic Drugs 
The other significant legal change facilitating the rise in generic drugs is 
the widespread adoption of state substitution laws requiring pharmacists to 
substitute available generic drugs when filling prescriptions.  Every state 
has now enacted these laws, which became popular because, given the 
lower price of generic drugs, they help reduce health care costs for state-run 
Medicaid programs. 
State substitution laws represent a complete reversal in public policy.  In 
the 1950s, the American Pharmaceutical Association (APhA), now known 
as the American Pharmacists Association, passed resolutions 
recommending that pharmacists dispense only the brand-name drug 
prescribed unless a physician specifically prescribed a generic drug.77  By 
1972, every jurisdiction except the District of Columbia had enacted some 
form of antisubstitution law.78 
 
 72. See FDA Notice, Determination That DECA-DURABOLIN (Nandrolone 
Decanoate) Injection, 200 Milligrams/Milliliter, 1 Milliliter, Was Not Withdrawn From Sale 
for Reasons of Safety or Effectiveness, 75 Fed. Reg. 48,351, 48,352 (Aug. 10, 2010). 
 73. See Julie A. Steinberg, Preempted:  Reference Drug Designation Doesn’t Save 
Generic Drug Suit, 40 PRODUCT SAFETY & LIABILITY REP. 67 (2012). 
 74. See Abbreviated New Drug Application Regulations, 57 Fed. Reg. 17,950, 17,958 
(Apr. 28, 1992). 
 75. See Steinberg, supra note 73 (discussing Moore v. Mylan Inc., No. 11-3037 (N.D. 
Ga., Jan. 5, 2012), in which the court rejected the plaintiff’s argument that the FDA’s 
designation of a generic seizure medication as the RLD conferred brand-name status on the 
manufacturer, eliminating its preemption defense under Mensing, discussed infra Part II). 
 76. See FDA Notice, Determination That DECA-DURABOLIN (Nandrolone 
Decanoate) Injection, 200 Milligrams/Milliliter, 1 Milliliter, Was Not Withdrawn From Sale 
for Reasons of Safety or Effectiveness, 75 Fed. Reg. at 48,352. 
 77. See Frank J. Ascione et al., Historical Overview of Generic Medication Policy, 41 J. 
AM. PHARMACEUTICALS ASS’N 567 (2001). 
 78. See BUREAU OF CONSUMER PROTECTION, DRUG PRODUCT SELECTION, STAFF REPORT 
TO THE FTC 150 (1979). 
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This legal environment changed in the 1970s, eventually flipping 180 
degrees.  Generic drugs became accepted as “safe alternatives” to most 
brand-name drugs, and APhA reversed its position, calling for the repeal of 
antisubstitution laws.79  In 1979, the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) and 
the FDA worked together to publish a model Drug Product Selection Act.80  
In adopting generic drug substitution laws, many states relied on an FDA 
publication known as the “Orange Book,” which provides guidance on the 
therapeutic equivalence of drugs but does not dictate which drugs may be 
substituted for one another.81 
While there are variations among state substitution laws, most of them 
allow a pharmacist to fill a prescription with a generic drug, regardless of 
whether the doctor wrote the name of the brand-name drug on the 
prescription.82  More than a dozen states require pharmacists to substitute a 
generic drug, when available, unless the physician has explicitly indicated 
that the pharmacist is to “dispense as written” or indicated “no 
substitution.”83  Estimates suggest that physicians mark prescriptions in this 
manner only between 5 and 15 percent of the time.84 
Most state substitution laws, but not all, also require the pharmacist to 
provide notice to the patient, and some states affirmatively require the 
patient’s consent when making a substitution.  A recent study found that 
requiring pharmacists to obtain consent from their patients before 
substituting a generic product for the prescribed brand-name drug led to a 
25 percent reduction in generic substitution.85  For this reason, some have 
 
 79. See id. at 153. 
 80. See id. at 273.  The major provisions of the model act included:  (1) allowing 
pharmacists to select a lower cost generic drug from a positive formulary, listing drugs that 
are therapeutically equivalent according to the FDA; (2) permitting physicians to prohibit 
substitution; (3) sharing savings from generic substitution among pharmacists and consumers 
(an incentive for pharmacists to use generic drugs); (4) allowing patients to choose whether 
or not they want less-expensive generic drugs; and (5) an optional provision assuring 
pharmacists that there is no greater liability for using generic drugs instead of brand-names. 
Id. at 274–88. 
 81. See generally FDA, supra note 52. 
 82. States with permissive generic substitution laws include Alabama, Alaska, Arizona, 
Arkansas, California, Colorado, Connecticut, Delaware, Georgia, Idaho, Illinois, Indiana, 
Iowa, Kansas, Louisiana, Maryland, Michigan, Mississippi, Missouri, Montana, Nebraska, 
New Hampshire, New Mexico, North Carolina, North Dakota, Ohio, Oklahoma, Oregon, 
Pennsylvania, South Carolina, South Dakota, Texas, Utah, Virginia, Wisconsin, and 
Wyoming. See DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., ASPE ISSUE BRIEF, EXPANDING THE USE 
OF GENERIC DRUGS app. A (2010), available at http://aspe.hhs.gov/sp/reports/2010/
GenericDrugs/ib.pdf. 
 83. Florida, Hawaii (anticonvulsants only), Kentucky, Maine, Massachusetts, 
Minnesota, Nevada, New Jersey, New York, Rhode Island, Tennessee, Vermont, 
Washington, and West Virginia mandate substitution of generic drugs for brand drugs.  Id. 
 84. See, e.g., FTC, PHARMACY BENEFIT MANAGERS:  OWNERSHIP OF MAIL-ORDER 
PHARMACIES xi (2005), available at http://www.ftc.gov/reports/pharmbenefit05/050906
pharmbenefitrpt.pdf. 
 85. See William H. Shrank et al., State Generic Substitution Laws Can Lower Drug 
Outlays Under Medicaid, 29 HEALTH AFF. 1383, 1388 (2010), available at http://www.
ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC3103121/pdf/nihms290401.pdf (examining Medicaid 
data for generic simvastatin and brand-name Zocor, a cholesterol-reducing drug). 
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advocated for eliminating patient choice as an additional cost-saving 
measure.86 
These laws, coupled with the wide availability of generic drugs, have 
significantly increased generic drug use.  In 1996, the market share of 
generic drugs increased to 43 percent,87 rising to 63 percent in 2006, and 78 
percent of all prescriptions dispensed in 2010.88  Now, the generic version 
of a drug, on average, seizes 80 percent of brand-name drug sales within six 
months of the loss of patent protection.89  Further, in 2011 alone, the FDA 
approved more than 400 generic drugs,90 including ninety-three products 
that were the first-approved alternatives to their branded-drugs 
counterparts.91  The Generic Pharmaceuticals Association boasts that, over 
the past two decades, the generic drug industry grew from $1 billion to $63 
billion in annual U.S. revenues.92  The distinctions in the regulatory 
regimes, therefore, have allowed generic drugs to dominate the post-patent 
marketplace, which is expected to continue.93 
II.  LIABILITY AND THE DIFFERENT REGULATORY STRUCTURES FOR 
BRAND-NAME AND GENERIC DRUGS 
The differences between brand-name and generic drugs, particularly with 
respect to the regulatory regimes that govern them, have led to divergent, 
and sometimes novel, liability theories and results. 
 
 86. See id. 
 87. CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, supra note 16, at 27 (basing estimate on drugs that come in 
easily countable units, such as tablets and capsules, and not including injectable drugs and 
prescription drugs dispensed in liquid form); PhRMA, 2011 PROFILE PHARMACEUTICAL 
INDUSTRY, KEY FACTS (2011), available at http://www.phrma.org/sites/default/files/159/
phrma_profile_2011_final.pdf (citing the IMS National Prescription Audit from February 
2011). 
 88. IMF INST. FOR HEALTHCARE INFORMATICS, THE USE OF MEDICINES IN THE UNITED 
STATES:  REVIEW OF 2010, at 22 (2011), available at http://www.imshealth.com/
deployedfiles/imshealth/Global/Content/IMS%20Institute/Static%20File/IHII_UseOfMed_
report.pdf. 
 89. Id. at 21; see also MEDCO HEALTH SOLUTIONS, 2009 DRUG TREND REPORT 22 (2009), 
available at http://medco.mediaroom.com/index.php?s=17885&cat=1561 (estimating that 
the typical market share for a branded drug falls to 6 percent for mail-order pharmacy 
prescriptions and 16 percent at retail within a month of the introduction of a generic version). 
 90. See Drug Approval Reports, FDA, http://www.accessdata.FDA.gov/scripts/cder/
drugsatFDA/index.cfm?fuseaction=Reports.ReportsMenu (last visited Feb. 15, 2013). 
 91. See ANDA (Generic) Drug Approvals, FDA, http://www.FDA.gov/Drugs/
DevelopmentApprovalProcess/HowDrugsareDevelopedandApproved/DrugandBiologic
ApprovalReports/ANDAGenericDrugApprovals/default.htm (last updated Jan. 4, 2013). 
 92. See About GPhA, The Industry, GENERIC PHARM. ASS’N, http://www.gphaonline.org/
about/the-industry/ (last visited Feb. 15, 2013). 
 93. See Katie Moisse, 10 Top-Selling Drugs Coming Off Patent, ABC NEWS (July 25, 
2011), http://abcnews.go.com/Health/Drugs/prescription-drug-prices-plummet/story?id=141
52014 (reporting that Plavix, Lipitor, Seroquel, Actos, Enbrel, Singulair, Levaquin, Zyprexa, 
Concerta, and Protonix lost patent protection in 2011 or will come off patent in 2012).  The 
best-selling drug ever, Lipitor, went off patent in December 2011, allowing patients to obtain 
the generic version, called atorvastatin, or continue to purchase the brand drug at generic-
level prices. See Zamosky, supra note 53; see also Sales of Lipitor Are Leveling Off, N.Y. 
TIMES, Jan. 13, 2012, at B4. 
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A.  The Advent of Novel Competitor Liability Theories for Shifting Generic 
Drug Liability to Manufacturers of Brand-Name Drugs 
Starting in the early 1990s, when brand-name pharmaceutical 
manufacturers maintained significant market share after a drug’s patent 
expiration, some creative plaintiffs’ lawyers developed a legal theory to try 
to subject brand-name manufacturers, who were perceived to have deep 
pockets, to liability even if plaintiffs took only generic forms of their drugs.  
They argued that the federal regulatory regime for prescription drugs, which 
links the generic’s design and labeling to its brand-name counterpart, 
creates the requisite connection to establish tort liability between the 
manufacturer of the brand-name drug and consumers of its generic 
competitors.94  In the individual cases, they would allege that the brand-
name drug manufacturers, either in labeling or promoting its own drug, 
misrepresented certain safety or efficacy information that led the consumer 
to end up taking the generic equivalent and becoming injured.95 
In 1994, the Fourth Circuit issued the first appellate decision on 
competitor liability for the pharmaceutical industry in Foster v. American 
Home Products Corp.,96 which involved a generic drug, Phenergan.97  The 
court held that a woman whose daughter died after taking the generic drug 
could not recover from the brand-name manufacturer, Wyeth.98  The Fourth 
Circuit, applying Maryland law, appreciated that the claims were “an effort 
to recover for injuries caused by a product without meeting the 
requirements the law imposes in products liability actions.”99  It held that 
plaintiffs could not creatively plead their claims, here in negligence 
misrepresentation or fraud, to get around product liability law.100  The 
plaintiff would still have to demonstrate that the defendant manufactured 
the product alleged to have caused the injury at issue.101  The federal law 
requirement that a generic drug’s label be a copy of the one used by the 
brand-name manufacturer did not change the state’s fundamental product 
liability law.102 
Until 2008, dozens of courts also rejected this theory.103  But, that year, a 
California appellate court in Conte v. Wyeth, Inc.104 broke with the others 
and allowed plaintiffs to state a claim against brand-name manufacturers for 
 
 94. See Allen Rostron, Prescription for Fairness:  A New Approach to Tort Liability of 
Brand-Name and Generic Drug Manufacturers, 60 DUKE L.J. 1123, 1173 (2011) (“The 
prescription drug scenario is therefore unlike situations in which one manufacturer 
unilaterally decides to imitate another manufacturer’s design and no other link connects the 
two companies.”). 
 95. See, e.g., Foster v. Am. Home Prods. Corp., 29 F.3d 165, 167–68 (4th Cir. 1994). 
 96. 29 F.3d 165 (4th Cir. 1994) (applying Maryland law). 
 97. Id. at 167. 
 98. Id. at 172. 
 99. Id. at 168. 
 100. Id. 
 101. Id. 
 102. Id. at 169. 
 103. See infra Part III.A. 
 104. 85 Cal. Rptr. 3d 299 (Cal. Ct. App. 2008). 
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harms resulting from generic drugs.105  In 2010, a federal district court, 
“interpreting” or guessing at what Vermont law might be, echoed this ruling 
in Kellogg v. Wyeth, Inc.106  In both cases, the courts sidestepped products 
liability law and the well-defined rights and responsibilities of warning and 
design defect to approve novel tort-based claims, including negligent 
misrepresentation and fraud.107 
Elizabeth Conte and Ethel Kellogg, the plaintiffs in the California and 
Vermont cases respectively, exclusively took generic metoclopramide—not 
the brand-name drug Reglan.108  They did so for several years in the early 
2000s.109  In lawsuits filed against Wyeth and the generic manufacturers of 
metoclopramide, Conte and Kellogg claimed that their physicians were not 
adequately warned of the seriousness of the potential consequences of long-
term use.110  The FDA-approved label for Reglan and generic 
metoclopramide indicated it for “short-term (4 to 12 weeks) therapy for 
adults with symptomatic, documented esophageal reflux who fail to 
respond to conventional therapy.”111  In 2009, the FDA found that chronic 
use of the drug had been linked to tardive dyskinesia, a severe neurological 
condition.112  Later that year, the FDA required all makers of 
metoclopramide to have a “black box” warning highlighting this risk.113 
Although Conte and Kellogg had not taken the brand-name drug, they 
both named Wyeth as a defendant.  They alleged that the drug’s initial 
manufacturer, A.H. Robins Company, which sold Reglan to Wyeth in 1989, 
aggressively promoted long-term use of Reglan before and soon after its 
approval in the mid-1970s through the mid-1980s for “vague 
gastrointestinal complaints.”114 It was during this time and upon this 
information, they allege, that physicians’ knowledge of the drug was 
shaped.115  It was of no consequence that for much of the time the plaintiffs 
took generic metoclopramide, Wyeth no longer made Reglan; Wyeth sold 
the rights to the Reglan name to another company in December 2001.116 
In Conte, the California court subjected Wyeth to potential liability under 
the torts of negligent misrepresentation and fraud.117  Under either tort, a 
plaintiff would have to show that the defendant made a false or misleading 
statement about the actual product at issue.118  Here, though, the court did 
 
 105. See id. at 304–05. 
 106. See Kellogg v. Wyeth, 762 F. Supp. 2d 694, 708–09 (D. Vt. 2010). 
 107. See Conte, 85 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 317–18; see also Kellogg, 762 F. Supp. 2d at 706–10. 
 108. See Conte, 85 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 305; see also Kellogg, 762 F. Supp. 2d at 697–98. 
 109. See Conte, 85 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 305; see also Kellogg, 762 F. Supp. 2d at 698. 
 110. See Conte, 85 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 305; see also Kellogg, 762 F. Supp. 2d at 699. 
 111. Kellogg, 762 F. Supp. 2d at 697 (quoting PHYSICIANS’ DESK REFERENCE 2604 (54th 
ed. 2000)). 
 112. See id. at 698–99. 
 113. See id. at 699. 
 114. Id. at 697; see also Conte, 85 Cal. Rptr. 3d. at 305. 
 115. See Kellogg, 762 F. Supp. 2d at 697. 
 116. Id. 
 117. Conte, 85 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 305, 320–21. 
 118. See id. at 307. 
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not find that Wyeth and A.H. Robins made such a statement about generic 
metoclopramide.  The reason the court allowed liability was that Conte’s 
prescribing physician did not read or rely upon warnings that came with the 
generic drug119 or even Wyeth’s labeling during the time he prescribed the 
drug to Conte.120  Rather, he testified in his deposition that he “probably” 
learned about the drug by reading the monograph on Reglan in the 
Physicians’ Desk Reference “during his residency training,” which was 
many years earlier.121 
The court, seizing on this statement, held that Wyeth had a common law 
duty to users of generic metoclopramide because it was “eminently 
foreseeable that a physician might prescribe generic metoclopramide in 
reliance on Wyeth’s representations about Reglan.”122  The court said: 
[A] defendant that authors and disseminates information about a product 
manufactured and sold by another may be liable for negligent 
misrepresentation where the defendant should reasonably expect others to 
rely on that information and the product causes injury, even though the 
defendant would not be liable in strict products liability because it did not 
manufacture or sell the product.123 
Because California law authorizes pharmacists to fill prescriptions for 
brand-name drugs with their generic equivalents unless the prescribing 
physician expressly forbids such a substitution, such substitutions are 
foreseeable.124  Wyeth appealed, but the Supreme Court of California 
declined to review the case. 
In 2010, a federal district court in Kellogg issued a similar opinion, “Erie 
guessing” at what might be Vermont law.125  Kellogg’s doctors also 
recalled reading a past version of the Physicians’ Desk Reference prior to 
prescribing the generic drug to her,126 and the court similarly found that 
“[u]sually the prescriber will not know which generic version will be 
dispensed by the pharmacy.”127  Citing Levine, the court found that brand-
 
 119. Id. at 318 (“[n]o evidence suggests that [the prescriber] relied on” generic warnings). 
 120. Id. at 308. 
 121. Id. 
 122. Id. at 313; see also id. at 315 (“[W]e find the conclusion inescapable that Wyeth 
knows or should know that a significant number of patients whose doctors rely on its product 
information for Reglan are likely to have generic metoclopramide prescribed or dispensed to 
them.”). 
 123. Id. at 311. 
 124. The trial court found that federal law preempted the plaintiff’s failure-to-warn claims 
against the manufacturers of generic metoclopramide. See id. at 305–06.  The appellate court 
declined to address the preemption argument, finding consideration of the constitutional 
issue unnecessary since the plaintiff could not prove her claim against any of the generic 
manufacturers because she conceded that she could not show her doctor relied on 
representations by any of the generic manufacturers. See id. at 320. 
 125. Kellogg, 762 F. Supp. 2d at 694.  The federal judge may well have been wrong as to 
how the Supreme Court of Vermont would rule on this issue; the state’s high court has 
adhered to traditional principles of tort law in sympathetic cases in the past. See, e.g., 
Goodby v. Vetpharm, Inc., 974 A.2d 1269 (Vt. 2009). 
 126. Kellogg, 762 F. Supp. 2d at 701. 
 127. Id. at 705. 
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name manufacturers are responsible for updating their label and the 
Physicians’ Desk Reference to reflect new risks and that 
it is reasonably foreseeable that a physician will rely upon a brand name 
manufacturer’s representations—or the absence of representations—about 
the risk of side effects of its drug, when deciding to prescribe the drug for 
a patient, regardless of whether the pharmacist fills the prescription with a 
generic form of the drug.128 
Therefore, “[a] reasonable jury could conclude that inadequate, misleading 
and inaccurate information provided by the Defendants was a proximate 
cause of Kellogg’s injury.”129 
While competitor liability theories have been asserted in dozens of cases, 
the idea of shifting liability from generic drugs to their brand-name 
counterparts has not generated much support; more than sixty courts have 
rejected such liability.130 
B.  The Supreme Court’s Rulings Creating Different Liability Rules for 
Generic Drug Manufacturers than for Makers of Brand-Name Drugs 
Speculation has arisen, though, that competitor liability theories could 
gain new traction as a byproduct of two recent Supreme Court rulings on 
the viability of state failure-to-warn claims against manufacturers of 
prescription drugs.  In the first case, the Court held that federal drug law 
does not preempt state failure-to-warn claims with respect to brand-name 
drugs;131 in the second case, it ruled that federal law does preempt failure-
to-warn claims stemming from the use of generic products.132  As a result, 
the Court allowed users of brand-name drugs to potentially have an avenue 
for recovery not available to users of generic drugs. 
The brand-name ruling came from the 2009 case Wyeth, Inc. v. Levine.  
The Court considered whether a plaintiff who had been administered brand-
name Phenergan, an antihistamine used to treat nausea, could claim that its 
manufacturer, Wyeth, inadequately warned of the risk of developing 
gangrene when the drug is injected into a patient’s vein rather than 
administered through an IV drip.133  The FDA had first approved injectable 
Phenergan in 1955,134 and the drug has long been available in generic form. 
In allowing the claim against Wyeth, the brand-name manufacturer, to go 
forward, a 6–3 majority of the Court reasoned it was not impossible for 
 
 128. See id. at 702, 709. 
 129. Id. at 702. 
 130. See Scorecard:  Non-Manufacturer, Brand-name Defendants in Generic Drug 
Cases, DRUG & DEVICE L. (Nov. 12, 2009), http://druganddevicelaw.blogspot.com/2009/11/
scorecard-non-manufacturer-name-brand.html (citing sixty-nine court decisions as of 
September 2012 that have refused to impose liability on a brand name drug manufacturers 
for injuries caused by its competitors’ generic drugs). 
 131. See Wyeth, Inc. v. Levine, 555 U.S. 555, 558–59 (2009). 
 132. See PLIVA, Inc. v. Mensing, 131 S. Ct. 2567, 2572 (2011). 
 133. Levine, 555 U.S. at 558. 
 134. Id. at 561. 
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Wyeth to comply with both federal labeling law and any state law warning 
requirements that would be derived if the litigation deemed its warnings 
inadequate.135  The majority opinion explained that Wyeth could have used 
the CBE process to add the safety information required by the jury’s 
determination and then seek FDA approval for that change.136  In order to 
demonstrate that FDA labeling law preempts a state failure-to-warn claim 
against a brand-name manufacturer, the manufacturer must show “clear 
evidence that the FDA would not have approved a change to [the drug’s] 
label.”137  While Wyeth showed that the FDA had approved Phenergan’s 
label and worked with the company to update the label several times, the 
Court said it did not show that the FDA would have prohibited the change 
required if the warning was deemed inadequate under a state’s tort law.138  
As a result, plaintiffs who take brand-name drugs can generally move 
forward with state failure-to-warn claims against the drug’s manufacturer. 
Two years later, in PLIVA, Inc. v. Mensing, the Supreme Court faced the 
preemption issue, but this time with respect to generic drugs.  In Mensing, 
two individuals who developed tardive dyskinesia claimed that the drug’s 
manufacturer failed to adequately warn of this risk.139  Here, as is often the 
situation, the plaintiffs’ doctors wrote the brand-name version of the drug, 
Reglan, on the prescriptions.140  Pursuant to state substitution laws, the 
pharmacists filled the prescriptions with generic metoclopramide 
manufactured by PLIVA,141 a Croatian pharmaceutical company.142 
As in Levine, the Court applied the forward looking “impossibility 
preemption” test.  Here, though, a 5–4 majority of the Court found that it 
would be impossible for PLIVA, as a manufacturer of generic drugs, to 
adhere to both its federal labeling requirements to use the “same” warning 
approved for the brand-name drug and to change those warnings to cure any 
defect a jury in a state failure-to-warn suit determines to exist.143  Unlike 
the manufacturer of the brand-name drug, a generic drug maker cannot use 
the CBE process to change its labels; it can only request the FDA to make 
such a change.144  This process for approving changes to warnings 
 
 135. Id. at 573. 
 136. Id. 
 137. Id. at 571.  Some defendants have met this standard. See, e.g. , Dobbs v. Wyeth 
Pharm., 797 F. Supp. 2d 1264, 1277 (W.D. Okla. 2011) (finding a failure-to-warn claim 
preempted where the regulatory history of Effexor presented “clear evidence” that, had the 
defendant submitted a stronger warning about adult suicide to the FDA, the FDA would have 
rejected it). 
 138. Levine, 555 U.S. at 568–73; see supra Part I.B.1 (discussing the CBE process). 
 139. PLIVA, Inc. v. Mensing, 131 S. Ct. 2567, 2572–73 (2011). 
 140. Id. at 2573. 
 141. Id. 
 142. Company Info, PLIVA, http://www.pliva.com/pliva/company-info (last visited Feb. 
15, 2013). 
 143. Mensing, 131 S. Ct. at 2579. 
 144. Id. 
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suggested by manufacturers of generic drugs, the Court continued, does not 
turn impossibility into possibility.145 
Thus, the distinction between the Levine and Mensing preemption rulings 
seem to hinge on the old adage about asking for forgiveness or permission.  
Brand-name manufacturers can change the label first and ask for permission 
second, while generics must ask for permission first and can only make a 
change once the FDA has agreed with the request.  Neither the process 
through which the warning was established nor the content of the warning 
is relevant to this preemption analysis.  The sole issue is whether the 
manufacturer had the ability to implement new labeling requirements 
demanded by a court decision finding that the product’s warning is 
inadequate.  The Court held that brand-name manufacturers could do so, 
while generic manufacturers could not.146 
The Court fully appreciated the potential tension its two rulings created 
for makers and users of prescription drugs: 
We recognize that from the perspective of [plaintiffs], finding pre-
emption here but not in [Levine] makes little sense.  Had [plaintiffs] taken 
Reglan, the brand-name drug prescribed by their doctors, [Levine] would 
control and their lawsuits would not be pre-empted.  But because 
pharmacists, acting in full accord with state law, substituted generic 
metoclopramide instead, federal law pre-empts these lawsuits.147 
Importantly, the Justices also indicated that they understood their ruling 
ended the ability of users of generic drugs to recover at all based on the 
content of a drug’s labeling.  The majority wrote, “We acknowledge the 
unfortunate hand that federal drug regulation has dealt [these plaintiffs], and 
others similarly situated.”148  The dissenters emphasized this point in 
explaining their opposition to the holding, stating, “As a result of today’s 
decision, whether a consumer harmed by inadequate warnings can obtain 
relief turns solely on the happenstance of whether her pharmacist filled her 
prescription with a brand-name or generic drug.”149  In this instance, “she 
now has no right to sue.”150 
The ruling, therefore, did not lay the groundwork for creating new ways 
for users of generic drugs to sue, including against the manufacturer of the 
brand name drug at issue.  Rather, the majority stated clearly that if these 
divergent liability rules for users and makers of generic and brand-name 
drugs did not represent the right public policy, Congress and the FDA could 
change the law and regulations to equalize the liability rules.151  Congress 
or the FDA could either revoke the preemption afforded to manufacturers of 
 
 145. See id. 
 146. Id. at 2581. 
 147. Id. 
 148. Id. 
 149. Id. at 2583 (Sotomayor, J., joined by Ginsburg, Breyer, & Kagan, JJ., dissenting) 
(emphasis added). 
 150. Id. at 2592 (emphasis added). 
 151. Id. at 2582. 
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generic drugs or affirmatively give brand-name drug manufacturers a 
comparable preemption defense. 
C.  Attempts To Circumvent Mensing Have Generated Novel Theories for 
Creating State Product and Tort Liability Notwithstanding the 
Purpose and Operation of Federal Drug Law 
Despite the Supreme Court’s understanding of Mensing’s impact on users 
of generic drugs, and of which arms of government have the authority to 
address the Court’s disparate preemption rulings, there have been creative 
litigation attempts to find alternative means for users of generic drugs to 
recover for injuries allegedly caused by inadequate warnings. 
Some post-Mensing attempts have focused on keeping manufacturers of 
generic drugs in the litigation, asserting for example, that manufacturers of 
generic drugs should still be subject to liability for “wrongful marketing” or 
not sending “dear doctor” letters to highlight a particular side effect 
associated with a drug.152  As a federal district judge in Tennessee 
explained in dismissing all such claims, “Mensing means what it says:  all 
failure to warn claims against generic drug manufacturers are preempted if 
generic manufacturers cannot independently alter their warning labels.”153  
Most courts have followed Mensing faithfully in this regard.154 
The First Circuit, however, created a stir when it allowed a case to 
proceed against a manufacturer of generic drugs on a design defect theory 
for simply selling the drug.  The First Circuit stated that “while the generic 
maker has no choice as to label[,] the decision to make the drug and market 
it . . . is wholly its own.”155  The court suggested that a jury should be able 
to “second-guess[] the FDA”156 and determine that the drug’s “risks 
 
 152. See, e.g., Looking for Loopholes in Pliva v. Mensing, LAW360 (Nov. 21, 2011), 
http://www.law360.com/articles/283282/looking-for-loopholes-in-pliva-v-mensing.  Most 
courts have rejected “wrongful marketing” claims that argue that while a generic drug 
manufacturer could not change the FDA-approved label, it had a duty to withdraw its 
dangerously designed drug from the market. See, e.g., Cooper v. Wyeth, Inc., No. 09-929-
JJB, 2012 WL 733846, at *6 (M.D. La. Mar. 6, 2012); In re Darvocet, Darvon & 
Propoxyphene Prods. Liab. Litig., No. 2:11-md-2226-DCR, 2012 WL 718618, at *2 (E.D. 
Ky. Mar. 5, 2012); Moretti v. Mut. Pharm. Co., 852 F. Supp. 2d 1114, 1118–19 (D. Minn. 
2012). 
 153. See Strayhorn v. Wyeth, Inc., No. 11-2058-STA-cgc, 2012 WL 3261377, at *10 
(W.D. Tenn. Aug. 8, 2012) (Order Granting Generic Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss).  The 
court rejected various theories asserted by the plaintiffs to avoid Mensing preemption. Id. at 
*14 (“At bottom, regardless of their packaging, Plaintiffs’ claims against the Generic 
Defendants ‘relate to the sufficiency of the [metoclopramide] warnings.’”). 
 154. See Katie Thomas, Generic Drugs Proving Resistant to Damage Suits, N.Y. TIMES, 
Mar. 21, 2012, at A1. But see Nate Raymond, Moss Sides with Plaintiffs in Reglan Mass 
Tort, LEGAL INTELLIGENCER (Nov. 21, 2011), http://www.law.com/jsp/pa/PubArticle
PA.jsp?id=1202533034673; Julie A. Steinberg, Failure To Update Warning a Colorable 
Claim; Court Joins Others Allowing Such Claims, BNA PRODUCT SAFETY & LIABILITY REP., 
Feb. 6, 2012. 
 155. Bartlett v. Mut. Pharm. Co., 678 F.3d 30, 38 (1st Cir. 2012), cert. granted, 133 S. Ct. 
694 (2012). 
 156. Id.  The trial would presumably consider whether all versions of sulindac, including 
the innovator drug, are defective in design, even though the FDA approved the brand-name 
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outweighed its benefits making it unreasonably dangerous to consumers, 
despite [the FDA] having never withdrawn its statutory ‘safe and effective’ 
designation.”157 
The First Circuit fully acknowledged that, historically, courts have not 
been willing to determine through the judiciary whether a prescription drug 
is defective in design.158  The Restatement (Second) of Torts § 402A 
explains in comment k that applying strict liability with regard to design 
defects in the pharmaceutical arena is improper because prescription drugs 
are “incapable of being made safe for their intended and ordinary use.”159  
The Restatement includes the example of the Pasteur treatment of rabies, 
which can lead to serious and damaging effects.160  It states that because the 
disease is deadly, the vaccine is justified even though it comes with an 
unavoidably high degree of risk.161  For each prescription drug, the 
manufacturers and the FDA try to explain the known risks in the labeling, 
and doctors and patients determine which risks are worth taking based on 
the benefit the drug can provide.162  The Restatement Third, Torts:  
Products Liability, based on this concept, makes it almost impossible to sue 
a drug company under a product liability design theory, stating that the 
standard for design defect is when a reasonable physician would not 
prescribe the drug for any class of patients.163 
As a result, courts have used a fault-based liability system based on the 
adequacy of warnings accompanying the drugs.  This is because, as the 
Restatement further explains, while prescription drugs are unavoidably 
unsafe, they are not unreasonably dangerous when accompanied by proper 
directions and warning.164  If a drug manufacturer meets the standard of 
care for labeling, the product is not defective and the manufacturer has not 
committed a tort.  The First Circuit panel conceded this point, stating that 
the defendant “could still have avoided liability by proving that [the drug] 
was unavoidably unsafe but was highly useful and had an adequate safety 
warning . . . [but it] abandoned that defense.”165 
 
drug’s specific design and warnings—not any ways in which the generic drug’s design may 
have differed from the innovator drug. 
 157. Id. at 34. 
 158. Id. at 35 (stating “courts ‘traditionally have refused to review the reasonableness of 
the designs of prescription drugs” (quoting RESTATEMENT THIRD, TORTS:  PRODUCTS 
LIABILITY § 6 cmt. f, at 156 (1998))). 
 159. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A cmt. k, at 353–54 (1965).  Dean Prosser, 
reporter for the Restatement (Second), chose to handle prescription drug liability in a 
comment rather than a separate section. See Brown v. Abbott Labs, 751 P.2d 470, 475 (Cal. 
1988). 
 160. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, § 402A cmt. k, at 353–54. 
 161. Id. at 353. 
 162. Id. 
 163. See RESTATEMENT THIRD, TORTS:  PRODUCTS LIABILITY § 6(c) (1998) (emphasis 
added). 
 164. Id. § 6(a)–(d). 
 165. Bartlett v. Mut. Pharm. Co., 678 F.3d 30, 36 (1st Cir. 2012), cert. granted, 133 S. Ct. 
694 (2012). 
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The court’s reason for this ruling, though, was clear.  The judges on the 
panel stated that they were willing to redefine the relationship between state 
liability law and federal drug laws because they did not believe a plaintiff 
should lose the right to recover “by the mere chance of her drug store’s 
selection of a generic.”166  They then urged the Supreme Court to take the 
case and review its novel design-defect theory, noting that “the Supreme 
Court has yet to decide” it but that it “needs a decisive answer from the only 
court that can supply it.”167  In this regard, the First Circuit panel seemed 
more interested in registering its objection to Mensing than setting 
precedent.  The ruling has generally not been followed,168 with the 
exception being a federal district court in Ohio.169  The Supreme Court has 
granted certiorari and should rule on the case this year.170 
The practice of creating new liability theories to find pockets for paying 
claims has been discredited and remains unjustified.  If a jury, looking in 
isolation at the injury to a single individual, second guesses the FDA and 
determines the drug’s design to be defective, the drug’s manufacturers may 
have to pull the drug from the market, just as if the FDA had withdrawn its 
approval.  As a result, the many individuals benefiting from the drug might 
be deprived of a successful treatment.  The temptation to solve the Levine-
Mensing dichotomy when a user of a generic drug appears in a courtroom 
and claims he or she would not have been injured but for the inadequacy of 
the information provided to his or her doctor is understandable.  But, courts 
should not change fundamental product liability and tort law in any such 
ends-justifies-the-means or deep pocket jurisprudence rulings. 
III.  IRRESPECTIVE OF MENSING, COMPETITOR LIABITLIY THEORIES 
VIOLATE FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES OF AMERICAN TORT LAW 
Since the Supreme Court decided Mensing in June 2011, plaintiffs’ 
lawyers have also increased their decades-long effort to use the interplay in 
the federal regulations between brand-name and generic drugs to create 
competitor liability for brand-name manufacturers.  Nevertheless, during 
these two years, courts have wisely continued to reject these efforts, 
emphasizing two key points:  competitor liability is still not supported by 
American tort or product liability law, and there is no intersection between 
Mensing and competitor liability. 
As a threshold matter, Mensing does not provide an invitation to give 
competitor liability a renewed look.  Here, case history provides important 
 
 166. Id. at 38. 
 167. Id. at 36, 38. 
 168. See, e.g., In re Darvocet, Darvon and Propoxyphene Prods. Liab. Litig., No. 2:11-
md-2226-DCR, 2012 WL 2457825, at *1 (E.D. Ky. June 22, 2012) (“This argument—which 
failed to persuade either the Supreme Court or the Eighth Circuit on remand in Mensing, and 
the Sixth Circuit in Smith v. Wyeth, Inc., 657 F.3d 420 (6th Cir. 2011)—is no more availing 
now.”). 
 169. Arters v. Sandoz, Inc., No. 2:10–cv–142, 2013 WL 308768 (S.D. Ohio Jan. 25, 
2013). 
 170. Mut. Pharm. Co., Inc. v. Bartlett, 133 S. Ct. 694 (2012). 
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context.  Earlier in their case, the Mensing plaintiffs had included claims 
against the manufacturers of brand-name Reglan even though the plaintiffs 
had taken only generic metoclopramide.171  The Court of Appeals for the 
Eighth Circuit dismissed those claims, echoing other rulings that “holding 
name brand manufacturers liable for harm caused by generic manufacturers 
‘stretch[es]  [the law] too far.’”172  The Supreme Court did not disturb this 
earlier determination that a person who never ingested a brand-name drug 
cannot bring common law tort claims against a brand-name manufacturer or 
signal that it would consider such a claim if it were before the Court.173  
Indeed, the Eighth Circuit on remand endorsed the view that the Supreme 
Court’s ruling in Mensing did not alter its earlier ruling that state tort law 
principles do not support competitor liability.174 
This hostile reception for allowing plaintiffs’ attorneys to search for a 
different pocket from which to pay users of generic drugs has persisted 
since Mensing was decided.  Most prominently, in the fall of 2011, the 
Sixth Circuit affirmed the dismissal of a generic drug user’s claims for 
state-law fraud, fraudulent concealment, and negligent misrepresentation 
against a brand-name drug manufacturer.175  Here, the court, applying 
Kentucky’s products liability law, stated that the findings of the Fourth 
Circuit in Foster still govern and competitor liability is not permitted: 
[A]dopting [plaintiff’s] theory of liability would require the court to 
attribute any deficiency in a name-brand manufacturer’s labeling and 
marketing of its products to products manufactured by its generic 
competitors.  Such a theory, however, fails to satisfy the threshold 
requirement of a products-liability action—that the defendant’s product 
have injured the plaintiff.  As the district court stated, “Just because a 
company is in the same business as a tortfeasor, the company is not 
automatically liable for the harm caused by the tortfeasor’s product.”176 
 
 171. See Mensing v. Wyeth, Inc., 588 F.3d 603, 605 (8th Cir. 2009), aff’d in pertinent 
part and vacated in part on other grounds, 658 F.3d 867 (8th Cir. 2011). 
 172. See id. at 613. 
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 174. In response to the Supreme Court’s ruling in Mensing, the Eighth Circuit mistakenly 
vacated its entire judgment, not just the part affected by the high court’s decision.  In 
response to a motion from the brand-name manufacturers to reinstate the part of its earlier 
ruling against competitor liability, the Eighth Circuit reinstated that part of the opinion. See 
Mensing v. Wyeth, Inc., 658 F.3d 867 (8th Cir. 2011). 
 175. Smith v. Wyeth, Inc., 657 F.3d. 420, 422 (6th Cir. 2011), cert. denied, 132 S. Ct. 
2103 (2012) (applying Kentucky law). 
 176. Id. at 423. 
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In October 2012, the Fifth Circuit similarly held that under Louisiana 
law, brand-name manufacturers cannot be subject to competitor liability 
theories because the manufacturer did not produce the product at issue.177 
The only court to use Mensing as a game changer for allowing 
competitor liability has been the Supreme Court of Alabama in Wyeth, Inc., 
v. Weeks.178  The issue arose as a certified question from the Middle 
District of Alabama.  As in Conte and Kellogg, Weeks ingested only 
generic metoclopramide, but sued the brand-name manufacturer for 
misrepresentation and fraud, claiming his physician was not adequately 
warned of the potential consequences of long-term use when the drug was 
marketed and sold by the brand-name manufacturer.179  In allowing the case 
to proceed, the Alabama high court discounted the scores of pre-Mensing 
rulings striking down competitor liability, stating that those decisions were 
based on the premise that the generic drugs’ manufacturers could be subject 
to liability if the warnings were not sufficient.180  It also set aside the many 
post-Mensing cases uniformly holding that whether or not federal law 
preempts warning-based claims against generic drug manufacturers has no 
impact whatsoever on whether state tort claims can be made out against 
makers of brand-name drugs. 
The Alabama court also contradicted long-standing product liability law, 
particularly with respect to pharmaceuticals.  Specifically, it stated that “a 
warning label is not part of the manufacturing process” and that while a 
manufacturer “will not be held liable for another manufacturer’s production, 
design, or manufacturing defect,” it could be subject to liability “when the 
plaintiff is arguing that he or she was injured by a failure to warn.”181  For 
more than fifty years, though, the premise for product liability with respect 
to pharmaceuticals and other products with inherent risks is that a product’s 
design and warnings are inextricably intertwined.  The product’s design 
cannot eliminate its inherent risks, so warnings are required to make the 
product nondefective or no longer unreasonably dangerous.182  As 
discussed above, this is the core issue before the Supreme Court in the 
Mutual Pharmaceutical Co. v. Bartlett design-defect case.183  In briefing 
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the Court, Solicitor General Donald Verrilli explained that “[a] defective-
drug-design claim often overlaps with a failure-to-warn claim.”184 
 Overall, nearly two dozen courts have assessed competitor liability 
theories since Mensing was decided.  Other than the Supreme Court of 
Alabama, all have held that Mensing does not alter state law principles that 
brand-name drug manufacturers cannot be liable for harms caused by their 
generic competitors.185 Courts that rule otherwise risk being perceived as 
being willing to subvert the law in an effort to find a pocket for paying 
claims.  Mississippi plaintiffs’ lawyer Dickie Scruggs famously commented 
on this tactic in the asbestos litigation context, saying that once the 
traditional defendants were no longer available to be sued, the litigation 
turned into “the endless search for a solvent bystander” to pay plaintiffs’ 
claims.186  As discussed below, there is no legal foundation supporting this 
tactic, either generally or particularly in pharmaceutical litigation. The 
federal regulatory regime for brand-name and generic drugs does not 
somehow support subjecting one to state tort liability for harms caused by a 
competitor’s product.187 
A.  Competitor Liability Violates Fundamental Principles 
of Product Liability Law 
As federal and state courts have explained, under product liability law, 
when a plaintiff is injured by a product and seeks to hold a manufacturer 
liable for her injuries, she can sue only the manufacturer of the product that 
caused the injury.188  Product liability law is based on the rationale that a 
seller is accountable for the risks internal to its operations, namely the 
manufacture, design, and warnings of the goods that it makes, distributes, or 
sells.189  It was decided long ago that manufacturers are not general insurers 
of their products.190 
 
 184. Brief of the United States As Amicus Curiae, Mutual Pharm. Co., v. Bartlett, No. 12-
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733 A.2d 712, 719 (R.I. 1999) (“A component part supplier . . . should not be required to act 
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As explained in the Restatement (Second) of Torts: 
[T]he justification for the strict liability has been said to be that the seller , 
by marketing his product for use and consumption, has undertaken and 
assumed a special responsibility toward any member of the consuming 
public who may be injured by it; that the public has the right to and does 
expect, in the case of products which it needs and for which it is forced to 
rely upon the seller, that reputable sellers will stand behind their goods; 
that public policy demands that the burden of accidental injuries caused 
by products intended for consumption be placed upon those who market 
them, and be treated as a cost of production against which liability 
insurance can be obtained; and that the consumer of such products is 
entitled to the maximum of protection at the hands of someone, and the 
proper persons to afford it are those who market the products.191 
Whether in the field of lawn mowers, pharmaceuticals, or cars, this 
foundation is absent when the plaintiff sues a manufacturer of a product he 
or she never used.  Manufacturers do not have any special responsibility to 
those who use a competitor’s product; they have no moral or legal 
obligation to stand behind the goods of another, and they are not in a 
position to incorporate the costs of liability into their prices when the 
liability is associated with products they did not make or sell.  They also are 
not insurers of their competitors’ products. 
This legal conclusion is abundantly clear in the twenty-five states that 
have statutory product liability laws.192  Most of these statutes were enacted 
in the 1980s and 1990s along the lines of the Uniform Product Liability Act 
(UPLA)193 or other model acts.194  These acts, like the UPLA, typically 
provide a single body of law for injuries stemming from products, 
providing manufacturers, product sellers, and consumers with needed 
clarity and predictability.195  Many of these laws define “product liability 
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 193. See Model Uniform Product Liability Act, § 103(a), 44 Fed. Reg. 62,714 (Oct. 31, 
1979). 
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action” as including any action for personal injury or death caused by 
warnings, instructions, marketing, packaging, or labeling of a product 
regardless of the substantive legal theory or theories upon which the action 
is brought.196  This includes injuries allegedly caused by generic drugs. 
Importantly, courts in many states with product liability acts have 
recognized that these acts provide the exclusive avenue through which 
plaintiffs can seek recompense for product-based injuries.197  Plaintiffs 
cannot, through creative pleadings such as in Conte, Kellogg, and Weeks, 
circumvent a state product liability act and create new common law theories 
of liability for harms caused by products in those states.198  As a federal 
district court explained, 
a “product liability action” is defined not by the substantive legal theory 
under which the plaintiff proceeds, but rather by the factual scenario that 
gives rise to the plaintiff’s claim and injury that results from the conduct 
of the defendant.  The term encompasses “all” actions that otherwise meet 
the strictures of its definition.199 
Thus, an individual alleging injury from a generic drug can sue successfully 
only when she can establish the elements of a product liability action 
against that defendant. 
In the dozens of state and federal rulings on this issue, it has become 
clear that competitor liability theories cannot exist under product liability 
law, whether that law is based in statute or common law.200  Product 
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negligence, strict liability, and failure to warn, are to be merged into one legal theory called a 
‘product liability claim.’”). 
 196. See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12-681(5) (2003); ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-116-
102(5) (2006); COLO. REV. STAT. § 13-21-401(2) (2012); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 52-572m(b) 
(West 2007); IND. CODE ANN. § 34-20-1-1 (West 2008); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-3302(c) 
(1994); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 411.300(1) (LexisNexis 2005); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. 
§ 9:2800.52 (2009); MISS. CODE ANN. § 11-1-63(c)(i) (West 2008); N.J. STAT. ANN. 
§ 2A:58C-8 (West 2000); N.C. GEN STAT. § 99B-1(3) (2011); N.D. CENT. CODE § 28-01.3-
01(2) (2006); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2307.71(13) (LexisNexis 2010); TENN. CODE ANN. 
§ 29-28-106(6) (2012); TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 82.001(2) (West 2011); 
WASH. REV. CODE § 7.72.010(4) (West 2007). 
 197. See, e.g., Stoddard v. Wyeth, Inc., 630 F. Supp. 2d 631, 633 (E.D. N.C. 2009) 
(noting that North Carolina’s product liability statute defines “product liability action to 
include any action brought for or on account of personal injury, death or property damage 
caused by or resulting from the manufacture, construction, design, formulation . . . warning, 
instructing, marketing, selling, advertising, packaging or labeling of any product” (internal 
quotation marks omitted)); Winslow v. Lewis-Shepard, Inc., 562 A.2d 517, 521 (Conn. 
1989); Patton, 861 P.2d at 1311; Monsanto Co. v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 950 S.W.2d 
811, 814 (Ky. 1997). 
 198. See, e.g., Winslow, 562 A.2d at 521; Patton, 861 P.2d at 1311; Monsanto Co., 950 
S.W.2d at 814; Wash. State Physicians Ins. Exch. & Ass’n v. Fisons Corp., 858 P.2d 1054, 
1066 (Wash. 1993).  
 199. Fields v. Wyeth, Inc., 613 F. Supp. 2d 1056, 1059 (W.D. Ark. 2009). 
 200. See, e.g., Bell v. Pfizer, Inc., No. 5:10CV00101, 2011 WL 904161, at *2–3 (E.D. 
Ark. Mar. 16, 2011); Cooper v. Wyeth Inc., No. 09-CV-929, 2010 WL 4318816, at *3 (M.D. 
La. Oct. 26, 2010); Neal v. Teva Pharm. USA, Inc., No. 09-CV-1027, 2010 WL 2640170, at 
*2 (W.D. Ark. July 1, 2010); Phelps v. Wyeth, Inc., No. 09-6168-TC, 2010 WL 2553619, at 
*3 (D. Or. May 28, 2010), adopted by 2010 WL 2553614 (D. Or. June 21, 2010); Fields, 613 
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identification and causation are fundamental requirements under all product 
liability law,201 meaning that when harm arises out of a product, a cause of 
action exists only against the manufacturer of the product in question.  As 
indicated earlier, the Sixth Circuit cited Kentucky’s product liability act in 
rejecting claims against brand-name drug manufacturers brought by users of 
generic drugs.202  Even the Conte court recognized that California’s product 
liability law cannot be contorted to extend a manufacturer’s liability to 
products that it did not make, distribute, or sell.203 
Of the trial court decisions since Mensing on this point, the one authored 
by Judge Carol Higbee of the New Jersey Superior Court has received 
particular attention because she presides over New Jersey’s mass tort 
pharmaceutical docket.  In June 2012, in a case involving users of generic 
metoclopramide, she held that the New Jersey Product Liability Act 
(NJPLA) precluded claims against the makers of brand-name Reglan.204 
There were three important parts to Judge Higbee’s ruling.  First, she 
concluded that, regardless of how the claims were pled, they fell squarely 
under the NJPLA; the NJPLA governs “any claim or action brought by a 
claimant for a harm caused by a product, irrespective of the theory 
underlying the claim.”205  Second, she held that under this product liability 
law, the claims failed because the defendant did not manufacturer the 
product that allegedly harmed the plaintiff.206  Third, she stated 
unequivocally that Mensing had no impact on this analysis.207  Mensing 
may harm a plaintiff’s ability to recover from the manufacturers of the 
 
F. Supp. 2d at 1058; Morris v. Wyeth, Inc., No. 09-0854, 2009 WL 40464103, at *5 (W.D. 
La. Nov. 23, 2009); Burke v. Wyeth Inc., No. G-09-82, 2009 WL 3698480, at *2 n.4 (S.D. 
Tex. Oct. 29, 2009); Stoddard, 630 F. Supp. 2d at 633; Smith v. Wyeth, Inc., No. 5:07-CV-
18-R, 2008 WL 2677051, at *4 (W.D. Ky. June 30, 2008), aff’d, 657 F.3d 420 (6th Cir. 
2011), cert. denied, 132 S. Ct. 2103 (2012); Wilson v. Wyeth, Inc., No. 3:07-CV-178-R, 
2008 WL 2677049, at *2 (W.D. Ky. June 30, 2008); Morris v. Wyeth, Inc., No. 1:07-CV-
176-R, 2008 WL 2677048, at *4 (W.D. Ky. June 30, 2008); Sheeks v. Am. Home Prods. 
Corp., No. 02CV337, 2004 WL 4056060, at *2 (Colo. Dist. Ct. Oct. 15, 2004); Condouris v. 
Wyeth, 2012 WL 2401776, at *7 (N.J. Super. Ct. June 26, 2012); Westerlund v. Wyeth, Inc., 
No. MID-2174-05, 2008 WL 5592753, at *3 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. Oct. 20, 2008); Sloan 
v. Wyeth Inc., No. MRS-L-1183-04, 2004 WL 5767103, at *9 (N.J. Super. Ct. Oct. 13, 
2004). 
 201. Fields, 613 F. Supp. 2d at 1060 (“A basic requirement of products liability actions 
. . . is product identification, i.e. that the actual product manufactured or distributed by the 
defendant caused injury to the plaintiff.”). 
 202. See Smith v. Wyeth, Inc., 657 F.3d. 420, 423–24 (6th Cir. 2011), cert. denied, 132 S. 
Ct. 2103 (2012) (applying Kentucky law). 
 203. See Conte v. Wyeth, Inc., 85 Cal. Rptr. 3d 299, 311 (Cal. Ct. App. 2008). (“We are 
not marking out new territory by recognizing that a defendant that authors and disseminates 
information about a product manufactured and sold by another may be liable for negligent 
misrepresentation where the defendant should reasonably expect others to rely on that 
information and the product causes injury, even though the defendant would not be liable in 
strict products liability because it did not manufacture or sell the product.” (emphasis 
added)). 
 204. Condouris, 2012 WL 2401776. 
 205. Id. at *4 (emphasis in original) (quoting N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:58C-1(b)(3)). 
 206. Id. at *5. 
 207. Id. at *6. 
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generic drugs used, she wrote, but it does not change state law, including 
the “essential element of a plaintiff’s prima facie products liability action 
[that he or she show] . . . proof that the manufacturer actually produced the 
product which gave rise to the plaintiff’s injury.”208 
Soon after Judge Higbee’s ruling, U.S. District Judge S. Thomas 
Anderson arrived at the same conclusion under the Tennessee Product 
Liability Act209 (TPLA), finding that plaintiffs’ claims against the brand-
name drug manufacturers were “easily capture[d]” within the TPLA’s 
definition of a products liability action.210  He stated that this was the 
majority approach and that “[p]laintiffs’ theory of liability as to brand name 
pharmaceutical manufacturers is not only an extreme minority position but 
also would mark a ‘fundamental policy innovation’ under Tennessee 
law.”211  Judge Anderson also concluded that, notwithstanding the TPLA, 
the claims also did not satisfy the traditional common law elements of 
products liability law.212  Finally, he held, for the reasons discussed in the 
next section, that the common law torts of misrepresentation, fraud, and 
warranty claims apply only to the seller of goods which allegedly caused 
the injury.213 
Courts around the country have applied similar reasoning in rejecting 
competitor liability claims under statutory and common law products 
liability law, both before and after Mensing.214 
B.  There Is No Tort Duty Between Manufacturers of Brand-Name Drugs 
and Users of Generic Drugs 
In an effort to circumvent product liability law, plaintiffs’ lawyers 
seeking to subject brand-name manufacturers to liability for harms caused 
by generic drugs have tried to recast their claims under other common law 
tort theories, usually negligent misrepresentation and fraud.  These common 
law tort theories, they argue, are distinct from products liability law and are 
not bound by product identification or other product liability requirements.  
 
 208. Id. at *7. 
 209. TENN. CODE ANN. § 29-28-102 (2012). 
 210. Strayhorn v. Wyeth, Inc., No. 11-2058-STA-cgc, 2012 WL 3217672, at *6 (W.D. 
Tenn. Aug. 8, 2012) (Order Granting Brand Name Defendants’ Motion for Summary 
Judgment).  The plaintiffs’ claims, which the court found fell within the TPLA, included 
strict liability in tort; negligence; breach of express or implied warranty; breach of or failure 
to discharge a duty to warn or instruct, whether negligent or innocent; misrepresentation, 
concealment, or nondisclosure, whether negligent, or innocent; constructive fraud; unfair and 
deceptive trade practices; conspiracy; unjust enrichment; and civil conspiracy. Id. 
 211. Id. at *8. 
 212. See id. at *7. 
 213. See id. at *8. 
 214. See, e.g., Meade v. Parsley, No. 2:09-cv-00388, 2009 WL 3806716 (S.D. W. Va. 
Nov. 13, 2009); DaCosta v. Novartis AG, No. CV 01-800-BR, 2002 WL 31957424, at *8–9 
(D. Or. Mar. 1, 2002); Dietrich v. Wyeth, Inc., No. 50-2009-CA-021586 XXX MB, 2009 
WL 4924722 (Fla. Cir. Ct. Dec. 21, 2009); Huck v. Trimark Physicians Grp., No. 
LACV018947, 2009 WL 3760458 (Iowa Dist. Ct. Feb. 27, 2009). 
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Courts by and large have rejected these creative pleadings.215  Regardless of 
the tort, manufacturers of brand-name drugs have no common law duty to 
the users of another’s products and, therefore, cannot be subject to liability 
for harms caused by their generic competitors.216 
All torts, including negligent misrepresentation and fraud, require a 
plaintiff to show that each defendant owed her a duty, which is a legal, not 
factual determination.217  As discussed above, the Conte, Kellogg, and 
Weeks courts concluded that a tort duty can be established between the 
manufacturer of the brand-name drug and the users of generic drugs solely 
because these manufacturers can “foresee” that statements made in labeling 
or promoting its drugs could, even years later, cause a patient to be 
prescribed and take a generic version of that drug.  They argue that the 
requirement that generic drugs have the “same” labeling as the brand-name 
drug and the operation of state generic substitution laws bolster this 
foreseeability argument.218 
The “foreseeability fallacy” in these rulings, though, is that the alleged 
harm is not a foreseeable result of the brand-name manufacturer’s conduct, 
but of laws over which the brand-name manufacturers have no control.  
Congress made the public policy decisions to lower barriers of entry for 
generic drugs, as have state legislatures in enacting laws to require certain 
prescriptions be filled with available generics.  Other courts have held that 
using these laws as a basis for supplying the duty element stretches 
foreseeability too far.  As one Florida court held, “[n]o federal statute or 
FDA regulation imposes a duty or suggests that a name brand manufacturer 
is responsible for the labeling of competing generic products.”219 
The other shortcoming in this analysis is that foreseeability alone does 
not determine duty in tort law.  While based in part on foreseeability, courts 
must also always consider public policy and basic fairness, including 
whether the defendant had control over the risk allegedly harming the 
 
 215. See, e.g., Mosley v. Wyeth, Inc., 719 F. Supp. 2d 1340, 1348 (S.D. Ala. 2010); 
Phelps v. Wyeth, Inc., No. 09-6168-TC, 2010 WL 2553619, at *3 (D. Or. May 28, 2010), 
adopted by 2010 WL 2553614 (D. Or. June 21, 2010); Moretti v. Wyeth, Inc., No. 2:08-CV-
00396-JCM-(GWF), 2009 WL 749532, at *3–4 (D. Nev. Mar. 20, 2009); Colacicco v. 
Apotex, Inc., 432 F. Supp. 2d 514, 540–41 (E.D. Pa. 2006), aff’d in pertinent part, 521 F.3d 
253 (3d Cir. 2008), vacated and remanded on other grounds, 129 S. Ct. 1578 (2009); 
Beutella v. A.H. Robins Co., No. 980502372, 2001 WL 35669202, at *2–3 (D. Utah Dec. 
10, 2001); Flynn v. Am. Home Prods. Corp., 627 N.W.2d 342, 350 (Minn. Ct. App. 2001). 
 216. See, e.g., Foster v. Am. Home Prods. Corp., 29 F.3d 165, 171 (4th Cir. 1994). 
 217. See generally RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS (1965). 
 218. See, e.g., Foster, 29 F.3d at 171 (“The Fosters contend that a duty exists in this case 
because it was foreseeable to Wyeth that misrepresentations regarding Phenergan could 
result in personal injury to users of Phenergan’s generic equivalents.”). 
 219. Dietrich, 2009 WL 4924722, at *7.  A study issued in 2012 by the Regenstrief 
Institute at Indiana University School of Medicine supports this point, finding that more than 
two-thirds of generic drug labeling showed discrepancies between the safety information on 
their labels from their brand-name counterparts. See Jon Duke et al., Consistency in the 
Safety Labeling of Bioequivalent Medications, PHARMACOEPIDEMIOLOGY & DRUG SAFETY 
(forthcoming 2013), available at http://pubcit.typepad.com/files/consistency-in-the-safety-
labeling-of-bioequivalent-medications_duke_pds.pdf. 
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plaintiff and the relationship between the parties.220  Other courts have 
appreciated this basic principle of tort law and have followed Foster’s 
ruling that imposing a duty must be based on more than mere 
foreseeability.221  With respect to the tort of negligent misrepresentation 
specifically, a duty arises only “when there is ‘such a relation that one party 
has the right to rely for information upon the other, and the other giving the 
information owes a duty to give it with care.’”222  In these cases, there is no 
qualifying relationship between the parties because the plaintiff is injured 
by a product that the brand-name manufacturer did not manufacture, nor did 
the brand-name manufacturer make any representations about that generic’s 
safety or efficacy.223  Other courts have held that brand-name 
manufacturers cannot reasonably expect consumers to rely on information 
about its medications when taking another company’s drug.224 
In their duty analyses, courts have also expressed concern over other 
public policy implications for establishing a duty between a brand-name 
drug manufacturer and consumers of generic competitors.225  For the most 
part, courts have pointed to 
unfair consequences [that] would result if we were to impose a duty upon 
[the brand-name manufacturer], when it obtained no benefit from the sale 
of [the] generic equivalent and had no control over the manufacturing or 
labeling of [the generic], yet it bore the expense of developing [the drug] 
from which [the generic manufacturer] materially benefits.226 
This situation, the courts have stated, “would be especially unfair when, 
as here, the generic manufacturer reaps the benefits of the name brand 
 
 220. See, e.g., Levine v. Wyeth, 684 F. Supp. 2d. 1338, 1345–48 (M.D. Fla. 2010) 
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514, 541 (E.D. Pa. 2006), aff’d in part , 521 F.3d 253 (3d Cir. 2008), cert. granted, judgment 
vacated, 129 S. Ct. 1578 (2009). 
 225. See, e.g., Sheeks v. Am. Home Prods. Corp., No. 02CV337, 2004 WL 4056060, at 
*2 (D. Colo. Oct. 15, 2004) (applying Foster and considering “the social utlity of 
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 226. Colaciccio, 432 F. Supp. 2d at 541. 
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manufacturer’s statements by copying its labels and riding on the coattails 
of its advertising.”227  In addition, allowing such liability would require a 
brand-name manufacturer to become insurers of the whole industry.  As 
discussed above, requiring manufacturers to be insurers of even their own 
products has been widely and wisely rejected.228 
Given the fact that brand-name manufacturers have only a small 
percentage of the post-patent market, the economics of this imbalance 
would lead to a host of other public policy concerns, which are discussed in 
detail later in this Article. 
C.  The Above Rulings To Maintain a Rational Boundary on Tort Law 
Duties Are Consistent with American Jurisprudence 
American courts, overall, have carefully controlled the situations when 
someone owed a tort law duty to another.  Over the course of American 
jurisprudence, there have been similar attempts to extend traditional tort or 
product liability duties where sympathetic plaintiffs may not otherwise have 
a viable or deep-pocket from which to recover. 
In the pharmaceutical context, Maryland’s highest court held that a 
plaintiff injured in a car accident by a diabetic who suffered an adverse 
reaction from an insulin product could not sue the manufacturer of the 
insulin because she had not used the drug herself.229  The plaintiff, as in 
Conte, argued that the law should recognize such a suit because it is 
“foreseeable” that if a manufacturer fails to adequately warn a patient about 
the risks from taking its drug, the patient will injure someone else when that 
risk manifests itself.230  But, as indicated above, foreseeability alone does 
not define the extent of a duty in tort law.  As the Maryland Court of 
Appeals explained in a unanimous ruling, under long-standing, fundamental 
tort law principles, there is no “duty to the world.”231  If there is no contact 
between the drug’s manufacturer and the plaintiff, there is no tort law duty. 
Similar efforts to expand tort law duties have arisen in other contexts, as 
plaintiffs’ lawyers regularly look to expand the pool of defendants that can 
 
 227. Foster, 29 F.3d at 170 (continuing that “[t]he premarketing approval scheme 
Congress established for generic equivalents of previously approved drugs cannot be 
construed to create liability of a name brand manufacturer when another manufacturer’s drug 
has been consumed”). 
 228. As Dean John Wade explained in the 1970s, it would be impossible for 
manufacturers to police customers to ensure that products are not used or neglected in ways 
that cause injury:  “Strict liability for products is clearly not that of an insurer.” See Wade, 
supra note 190, at 828; see also Buonanno v. Colmar Belting Co., 733 A.2d 712, 719 (R.I. 
1999) (“A component part supplier . . . should not be required to act as insurer for any and 
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 229. Gourdine v. Crews, 955 A.2d 769 (Md. 2008). 
 230. Id. at 772. 
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be sued for a given injury.232  Courts, though, have consistently declined 
invitations to stray from the core principle of product liability law that only 
a company in the chain of distribution of the product that allegedly caused 
the plaintiff’s injury is subject to liability.233 
The California Supreme Court, in a decision with potential repercussions 
for Conte’s continued viability in that state, denied such an extension of 
duty in the O’Neil v. Crane Co.234 asbestos case.  The case involved a 
mesothelioma plaintiff allegedly exposed to asbestos in the late 1960s as a 
result of supervising individuals who repaired equipment in the engine and 
boiler rooms of a World War II–era naval ship.235  While the defendants did 
not sell products containing the asbestos to which the plaintiffs were 
allegedly exposed, plaintiffs argued that the defendants had a duty to warn 
them of the hazards of asbestos because their injuries were allegedly caused 
by adjacent products or replacement parts made by others that the 
defendants knew or could foresee would be used in conjunction with their 
products.236  The court found that while “manufacturers, distributors, and 
retailers have a duty to ensure the safety of their products . . . we have never 
held that these responsibilities extend to preventing injuries caused by other 
products that might foreseeably be used in conjunction with a defendant’s 
product.”237 
The California Supreme Court reasoned that requiring manufacturers to 
warn about the dangerous propensities of products they did not design, 
make, or sell is contrary to the purposes of both product liability and 
common law tort duty.  In strict liability, “the costs of injuries resulting 
from defective products are borne by the manufacturers that put such 
products on the market” or who are in the chain of commerce for that 
 
 232. See Mark A. Behrens, What’s New in Asbestos Litigation?, 28 REV. LITIG. 501, 542 
(2009); see, e.g., Conner v. Alfa Laval, Inc., 842 F. Supp. 2d 791, 794 n.4, 801 (E.D. Pa. 
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 233. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A (1965); RESTATEMENT THIRD, TORTS:  
PRODUCTS LIABILITY §§ 1–2 (1998). 
 234. 266 P.3d 987 (Cal. 2012). 
 235. Id. at 993. 
 236. Id. 
 237. Id. at 991. 
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product.238  With respect to tort duties, “foreseeability alone is not 
sufficient to create an independent tort duty” and thus there is no liability 
where a defendant’s product did not cause the plaintiff’s harm.239  It 
concluded that “[t]he same policy considerations that militate against 
imposing strict liability in this situation apply with equal force in the 
context of negligence.”240 
Pharmaceutical liability is no different.241  A physician may have been 
influenced in prescribing a drug by what the makers of brand-name drugs 
have said about their products, but the same can be said for any number of 
products.  Consider the example of a mother purchasing a minivan and 
learning about side curtain airbags at a Chrysler dealership while looking at 
a Town & Country.  Now suppose she decides to buy a Toyota Sienna, and 
based on the knowledge she gained at the Chrysler dealership, insists that 
her Sienna come with side curtain airbags.  If the Sienna airbags are 
defective or cause injury to her children, she has no claim against Chrysler.  
This is true regardless of whether Toyota’s side curtain airbags work the 
same way as Chrysler’s, are made to the same standards, or were even made 
by the same part supplier.  Chrysler, as with the brand-name drug 
manufacturer, did not make any statements about and did not profit from 
the sale of its competitor’s product.  There are no falsely gained profits.242 
Indeed, there is no principle limiting competitor liability to prescription 
drugs.  What if a foreign company over which U.S. courts do not have 
jurisdiction reverse engineers an American manufacturer’s lawnmower and 
sells it with identical packaging, instructions, and warnings?  What if, 
instead of FDA law creating the connection between the innovator and the 
subsequent generic product, federal patent law is used to link the two?  
Should anyone who files a patent and divulges the design of a product 
foresee that a consumer will be injured by a competitor’s product that 
builds off their technology?  Competitor liability does not make sense in 
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1963)). 
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these other contexts, and it does not make sense in the pharmaceutical 
industry either. 
D.  Expanding Liability for a Competitor’s Product Is Not 
Sound Health Policy 
As courts have recognized, often in the public policy part of their duty 
analyses, shifting liability to brand-name drug manufacturers for injuries 
allegedly stemming from products of their generic competitors has 
significant downsides.243  As a primary matter, the economics of the 
pharmaceutical industry do not support competitor liability.  Saddling 10 
percent of a market with 100 percent of its liability is certain to create new 
and significant financial pressures on brand-name drugs, the effects of 
which would harm health care consumers.  Consider the following three 
concerns. 
First, consumers would likely have to pay higher prices for brand-name 
drugs during the period of exclusivity so that the drugs’ manufacturers 
could amass resources for anticipated competitor liability claims.  As 
discussed earlier, once generics become available, the brand-name 
manufacturer’s share of the market now shrinks to a fraction of its size 
within a few months.244  Accordingly, their ability to afford competitor 
liability claims after their period of exclusivity ends will be more quickly 
and more greatly diminished than in years past. 
Second, the fear of such liability would likely drive many brand-name 
manufacturers from a drug’s market once it becomes available in generic 
form.  Ironically, some plaintiffs have argued that manufacturers of brand-
name drugs can never escape competitor liability, even by withdrawing 
from the market, saying that the basis for liability can be the representations 
made when educating physicians about their drugs during the period of 
exclusivity.  Even the judge authoring the Kellogg opinion has rejected this 
argument, subsequently holding that the any duty he held that a 
manufacturer of brand-name drugs has to users of their generic competitors 
is extinguished once the brand-name manufacturer leaves the market and no 
longer has a duty to warn about the potential risks of a drug.245  Should the 
brand-name manufacturer prematurely withdraw from the market over 
liability, consumers will have lost the company most familiar with a 
medicine and the one that likely has the greatest infrastructure and 
 
 243. Kelly v. Wyeth, No. Civ.A.MICV200303314B, 2005 WL 4056740 (Mass. Super. Ct. 
May 6, 2005) (dismissing claims against Wyeth stemming from generic metoclopramide). 
 244. See MEDCO HEALTH SOLUTIONS, supra note 89, at 22 (using the brand name drug 
Fosamaxas an example, which lost 94 percent of its market share at mail and 84 percent of 
its market share at retail within thirty days of its generic equivalent becoming available). 
 245. See Lyman v. Pfizer, Inc., No. 2:09-cv-262, 2012 WL 2970627, at *16 (D. Vt. July 
20, 2012) (stating when Wyeth transferred its rights and responsibilities for Reglan® to 
Schwarz, “Wyeth lost any ability to change the design of Reglan or its label”); see also In re 
Darvocet, Darvon & Propoxyphene Prods. Liab. Litig., No. 2:11-2226-DCR, 2012 WL 
3109424, at *3 (E.D. Ky. July 31, 2012) (concluding that Lilly could not change its drug’s 
label once it left the market). 
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resources to facilitate postmarket research and analysis into any late 
developing safety issues with a drug.246 
Third, it will become riskier for brand-name manufacturers to dedicate 
resources to researching and developing potentially life-saving or life-
improving medicines, particularly when those medicines have greater health 
risks or are for small communities of people that will not drive large 
revenues.247  As discussed in detail above, on the average, it takes ten to 
fifteen years and $1.2 billion to bring a new drug to market, with the FDA 
only approving a tenth of the new drug applications it receives.248  Drugs 
with high litigation risk will be avoided in favor of safer blockbusters that 
can make up for these costs. 
In addition, the underpinning of competitor liability, namely, that the 
risks are the same for generic and brand-name drugs, is not always true.  
Brand-name and generic drugs are biologically equivalent, but not 
necessarily identical.249  For instance, there are certain drugs known to have 
a narrow therapeutic index (NTI), meaning that small variations in the 
dosage or release method can have a critical effect.250  Such minor 
differences, for example, can have a significant impact on the treatment of 
epilepsy, hypothyroidism, and immunosuppressive therapy required to 
prevent transplant rejection.251  Similarly, many doctors are reluctant to 
substitute generic warfarin for the brand-name anticoagulant Coumadin 
 
 246. See Letter from Jerome D. Jabbour, Senior Vice President & Head of Legal Affairs, 
Morton Grove Pharm., Inc., to Div. of Dockets Mgmt., FDA (HFA-305) (Sept. 30, 2011), 
available at http://www.hpm.com/pdf/blog/MGP%20Comments%20to%20PC%20CP.pdf. 
 247. See Richard A. Epstein, Legal Liability for Medical Innovation, 8 CARDOZO L. REV. 
1139, 1153–54 (1987) (“If in the aggregate the net gains [to consumers and pharmaceutical 
companies] are wiped out by the liability costs, then the product will no longer be made.  If 
some net gains survive, then fewer units will be produced to reflect the changes in rules and 
some marginal consumers must do without.”); W. Kip Viscusi et al., A Statistical Profile of 
Pharmaceutical Industry Liability, 1976–1989, 24 SETON HALL L. REV. 1418, 1419 (1994) 
(“[T]he net effect of the surge in liability costs had been to discourage innovation in the 
pharmaceutical industry.”). 
 248. PhRMA, supra note 42, at 1. 
 249. See supra Part I.A.2. 
 250. See Tina Zerilli et al., To Substitute or Not To Substitute:  That Is the Question, 
PHARMACY TIMES (Mar. 14, 2011), http://www.pharmacytimes.com/publications/issue/2011/
March2011/GenericFeature-0311. 
 251. See, e.g., Rita R. Alloway et al., Report of the American Society of Transplantation 
Conference on Immunosuppressive Drugs and the Use of Generic Immunosuppressants, 3 
AM. J. TRANSPLANTATION 1211 (2003); K. Liow et al., Position Statement on the Coverage 
of Anticonvulsant Drugs for the Treatment of Epilepsy, 68 NEUROLOGY 1249 (2007) 
(position of the American Academy of Neurology); Report of the American Society of 
Transplantation Conference on Immunosuppressant Drugs and the Use of Generic 
Immunosuppressants, 3 AM. J. TRANSPLANTATION 1211 (2003); Am. Thyroid Ass’n, The 
Endocrine Soc’y, Am. Ass’n of Clinical Endocrinologists, Joint Statement on the U.S. Food 
and Drug Administration’s Decision Regarding Bioequivalence of Levothyroxine Sodium, 
ENDOCRINE SOC’Y, http://www.endo-society.org/advocacy/legislative/upload/Joint_
Statement_Levothyroxine-Thyroxine.pdf (last visited Feb. 15, 2013). 
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when their patients have been stabilized on Coumadin.252  Indeed, it is not 
unusual for individuals switching drugs in a variety of contexts to report 
that the change in drugs either led to side effects not present with the 
original or did not result in the same effective treatment.253 
Finally, additional litigation against brand-name manufacturers is not 
needed to create a deterrence effect.  If labeling or marketing practices 
overstate benefits or downplay risks of a drug, brand-name manufacturers 
can be subject to significant liability, as well as substantial civil fines from 
the U.S. Department of Justice and state attorneys general.254 
By contrast, the only rationale for liability here is to find a pocket for 
compensating someone alleging that they have been unfairly injured.  
Compensation alone, though, is not a sufficient reason for establishing tort 
liability.255  Deep-pocket jurisprudence is law without principle.  As one 
federal judge explained, “I cannot find that a decision to hold a 
manufacturer liable for injury caused by its competitor’s product is rooted 
in common sense.”256 
E.  Creative Pleadings and Arguments Cannot Overcome the Innate 
Deficiencies in Competitor Liability 
Throughout the two-decade effort to create competitor liability on 
manufacturers of brand-name drugs, plaintiffs’ attorneys have developed 
several creative theories for circumventing the solid, growing body of case 
law against them.  The core deficiencies inherent to competitor liability, 
though, are not cured by creative pleadings and arguments. 
 
 252. See John Gever, Kristina Fiore & Todd Neale, Generic Versus Brands:  How It 
Plays Out in Practice, MEDPAGE TODAY (Aug. 24, 2009), http://www.medpagetoday.com/
ProductAlert/Prescriptions/15665. 
 253. See, e.g., Robyn Shelton, Rx for Trouble?  Generics Don’t Always Work As Well As 
Brand Names, Critics Say.  FDA Disagrees.  We Take a Look., ORLANDO SENTINEL (Aug. 
10, 2008), http://articles.orlandosentinel.com/2008-08-10/news/generic10_1_generics-drug-
brand? (reporting on patient experiences finding that generic drugs for treatment of high 
blood pressure, epilepsy, and depression did not work as well as the brand-name drug or 
found variations in effectiveness among generic versions of a drug); Defending Generic 
Drugs, PEOPLE’S PHARMACY (Dec. 19, 2011), http://www.peoplespharmacy.com/2011/12/
19/defending-generic-drugs/ (providing comments from numerous individuals who reacted 
adversely after they switched from brand to generic drugs used to treat a wide range of 
conditions, including epilepsy, hypothyroidism, migraines, sleeplessness, depression, and 
osteoporosis as well as substitution of warfarin for Coumadin). 
 254. See, e.g., Katie Thomas, J.&J. Fined $1.2 Billion in Drug Case, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 
12, 2012, at B1 (discussing $1.2 billion fine against Johnson & Johnson related to its 
marketing of the drug, Risperdal, and noting civil penalties against Janssen Pharmaceuticals 
of $158 million in Texas, $327 million in South Carolina, and $258 million in Louisiana). 
 255. See Sarah C. Duncan, Note, Allocating Liability for Deficient Warnings on Generic 
Drugs:  A Prescription for Change, 13 VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L. 185 (2010) (suggesting the 
creation of a federal trust fund, similar to the Vaccine Injury Compensation Trust Fund, to 
compensate plaintiffs who prove deficiencies in generic drug labels). 
 256. Phelps v. Wyeth, Inc., No. 09-6168-TC, 2010 WL 2553619, at *2 (D. Or. May 28, 
2010). 
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For example, plaintiffs have recently argued that the Restatement 
(Second) of Torts § 324A authorizes competitor liability because the brand-
name manufacturers voluntarily accepted such liability.257  This is a twist 
on the foreseeability argument.  Its premise is that because brand-name 
manufacturers know that the representations and labeling associated with 
their drugs will become the basis for the use of generic versions of their 
drugs, they voluntarily assumed responsibility for harms caused by those 
generic drugs.  To demonstrate this point, they mention that brand-name 
manufacturers maintain control over the information and labels for generic 
versions of their drug; by changing their own labeling, they automatically 
trigger a change in the generic’s label.258  Therefore, by not changing their 
labeling, they voluntarily undertook a responsibility, but then failed to 
intervene to avoid the plaintiffs’ harm. 
Restatement (Second) of Torts § 324A, which provides the “good 
Samaritan” rule, in no way authorizes such liability.  The provision applies 
only when someone “undertakes, gratuitously or for consideration, to render 
services to another.”259  Manufacturers of brand-named drugs, in selling 
and marketing their own drugs, are not “rendering” services to the generic 
drug manufacturers or their customers.260  Their operations are focused 
solely on selling their own products.  Accordingly, they are only 
“responsible for the accuracy and adequacy of its label,”261 not anyone 
else’s products. 
Some plaintiffs have also alleged that brand-name manufacturers can be 
subject to competitor liability under fraud and conspiracy charges.  They 
allege that the brand-name companies, by not changing their labeling, 
suppress material health effects of both their drugs and the generic versions 
of their drugs.  In fraud terms, the brand-name manufacturers, they say, 
knowingly mislead doctors and patients who relied on the false statements, 
and those patients sustained injuries as a result of this concealment.  These 
theories, in particular, have been tried in Florida and are based on market 
share and tobacco litigation rulings in that state.262 
 
 257. Swicegood v. Pliva, Inc., 543 F. Supp. 2d 1351, 1356 (N.D. Ga. 2008). 
 258. Id. at 1354. 
 259. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 324A (1965). 
 260. See, e.g., Mosley v. Wyeth, Inc., 719 F. Supp. 2d 1340, 1347–48 (S.D. Ala. 2010); 
Schrock v. Wyeth, Inc., 601 F. Supp. 2d 1262, 1266 (W.D. Okla. 2009); Smith v. Wyeth, 
Inc., No. 5:07-CV-18-R, 2008 WL 2677051, at *4 (W.D. Ky. June 30, 2008), aff’d, 657 F.3d 
420 (6th Cir. 2011), cert. denied, 132 S. Ct. 2103 (2012); Wilson v. Wyeth, Inc., Civ. No. 
3:07-CV-378-R, 2008 WL 2677049, at *4 (W.D. Ky. June 30, 2008), aff’d, 657 F.3d 420 
(6th Cir. 2011), cert. denied, 132 S. Ct. 2103 (2012); Morris v. Wyeth, Inc., Civ. No. 1:07-
CV-176-R, 2008 WL 2677048, at *4 (W.D. Ky. June 30, 2008), aff’d, 657 F.3d 420 (6th Cir. 
2011), cert. denied, 132 S. Ct. 2103 (2012). 
 261. PLIVA, Inc. v. Mensing, 131 S. Ct. 2567, 2574 (2011) (emphasis added). 
 262. See, e.g., Engle v. Liggett Grp., Inc., 945 So. 2d 1246 (Fla. 2006); Conley v. Boyle 
Drug Co., 570 So. 2d 275 (Fla. 1990) (establishing market share theory in DES drug case); 
Rey v. Phillip Morris, Inc., 75 So. 3d 378, 383 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2011) (stating that “[t]he 
law of civil conspiracy is striking in its extension of liability to a co-conspirator which may 
not have caused any direct injury to the claimant”). 
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As Florida courts have maintained, though, any such broad interpretation 
of fraud-based claims would “render virtually any manufacturer liable for 
the defective products of an entire industry, even if it could be demonstrated 
that the product which caused the injury was not made by the defendant.”263  
It is hornbook tort law that in fraud and misrepresentation cases, “the 
defendant is not liable if the plaintiff relies on the information in a type of 
transaction the defendant does not intend to influence.”264  Branded 
manufacturers, in marketing and selling drugs, are seeking to facilitate a 
market for their own products.  They are not seeking to induce anyone to 
purchase a competitor’s product.  The same is true for businesses in other 
industries. 
Other, more creative theories have surfaced.  For example, some have 
suggested that manufacturers could be subject to liability under component 
part liability, which would require the warning labels to be categorized as a 
component part of the generic drug,265 or pursuant to vicarious liability 
theories.266  In New York, a plaintiff invoked the state’s consumer fraud 
statute, but the federal district court explained that the consumer fraud claim 
fails because it too requires the element of causation and because the brand-
name manufacturer did not produce the drugs at issue, the causation 
element is interrupted.267  Others have theorized that if generic 
manufacturers are unavailable for liability, through preemption or other 
means, then the brand-name manufacturer should have “secondary 
liability.”268  Yet others, including the Supreme Court of Alabama, have 
tried to go back and undermine the seminal case of Foster and its progeny, 
suggesting that they rejected competitor liability only under the premise 
 
 263. Rey, 75 So.3d at 382 (quoting Conley v. Boyle Drug Co., 477 So.2d 600, 603 (Fla. 
Dist. Ct. App. 1985)); see also Pulte Home Corp. v. Ply Gem Indus., 804 F. Supp. 1471, 
1484–85 (M.D. Fla. 1992) (“It is well established under Florida law and elsewhere that 
identification of the product that caused the harm as the one sold or manufactured by the 
defendant is an essential element of traditional tort law.”). 
 264. DAN B. DOBBS, THE LAW OF TORTS 1372 (2000). 
 265. See generally Dietrich v. Wyeth, Inc., No. 50-2009-CA-021586 XXX MB, 2009 WL 
4924722 (Fla. Cir. Ct. Dec. 21, 2009); Beatrice Skye Resendes, Note, The Extinct 
Distinction of Privity:  When a Generic Drug Label Fails To Warn, the Drug’s Pioneer 
Should Be Liable As Component Part Supplier of the Warning Label, 32 T. JEFFERSON L. 
REV. 95 (2009). 
 266. Vicarious liability permits one party to be liable for the tortious conduct of another 
in highly limited circumstances. See KEETON, supra note 220, § 69, at 500.  The brand-name 
manufacturer has no control over another manufacturer that copies its product.  There is 
typically no agreement, contract or otherwise, between brand-name and generic 
manufacturers that qualify their relationship as a joint venture.  Perhaps most significantly, 
in regard to the fundamental basis for vicarious liability, the brand-name manufacturer does 
not profit from sales of a competitor’s products. See id. (noting in the employment context, 
the “modern justification for vicarious liability” to place the loss on the employer for the 
torts of employees because the employer “sought to profit” from actions in pursuit of its 
enterprise). 
 267. See Goldych v. Eli Lilly & Co., No. 5:04-CV-1477, 2006 WL 2038436, at *8 
(N.D.N.Y. July 19, 2006). 
 268. Rostron, supra note 94, at 1129. 
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that the generic’s manufacturer could be subject for failure-to-warn 
liability.269 
Regardless of the creativity of one’s arguments or pleadings, all of these 
theories falter on the same principles:  the brand-name manufacturer did not 
say or do anything related to its competitors’ products, and neither the 
operation of federal drug law nor the availability of the generic drug’s 
manufacturer for liability impacts whether state tort or product liability 
theories can be established against the manufacturers of brand-name 
drugs.270 
IV.  CONGRESS IS THE BRANCH OF GOVERNMENT FOR DECIDING WHETHER 
FEDERAL DRUG LAW CAN BE USED TO CREATE LIABILITY 
As the Supreme Court appreciated in Mensing, if liability stemming from 
federal drug law needs to be changed, Congress and the FDA, acting 
pursuant to congressional authority, are the appropriate arms of government 
for making these decisions in the context of fashioning the best health care 
policy for the country.  With regard to Mensing, these discussions are 
already taking place, ranging from a decentralized system where each drug 
manufacturer has responsibility over its own labeling to an FDA-centric 
system where the FDA makes all labeling decisions for a drug once its 
patent expires and it becomes available from multiple sources. 
The decentralized approach was first put forth two months after the 
Mensing decision.  Public Citizen filed a petition with the FDA requesting 
that the agency change the rights and responsibilities of generic drug 
manufacturers so that they can independently change their labeling and be 
subject to liability for their labels’ content.271  The FDA is actively 
 
 269. In Foster, the court explained that there were two separate issues:  (1) whether the 
plaintiff was able to recover from the generic drug’s manufacturer and (2) whether the 
defendant Wyeth could be held responsible for the patient’s injuries. See Foster v. Am. 
Home Prods. Corp., 29 F.3d 165, 169 (4th Cir. 1994).  While the court held that the generic 
drug’s manufacturer could be subject to liability, which has now been overturned by 
Mensing, that decision was not a predicate for its holding denying liability against the brand-
name manufacturer. See id. at 170 (stating unequivocally that it “also reject[s] the contention 
that a name brand manufacturer’s statements regarding its drug can serve as the basis for 
liability for injuries caused by another manufacturer’s drug.”). 
 270. See id. at 170 (“The premarketing approval scheme Congress established for generic 
equivalents of previously approved drugs cannot be construed to create liability of a name 
brand manufacturer when another manufacturer’s drug has been consumed.”). 
 271. See Citizen Petition, PUB. CITIZEN (AUG. 29, 2011), http://www.citizen.org/
documents/Citizen-Petition-8-26.pdf (filed with the FDA) (Docket No. FDA-2011-P-0675-
0001).  On March 9, 2012, the FDA provided Public Citizen with an “interim response” 
indicating that the FDA had been “unable to reach a decision on your petition because it 
raises complex issues requiring extensive review and analysis by Agency officials.”  Letter 
from Jane A. Axelrad, Assoc. Dir. for Policy, Ctr. for Drug Evaluation & Research, to 
Sidney M. Wolfe & Brian Wolfman (Mar. 9, 2012), available at http://www.regulations.gov/
#!documentDetail;D=FDA-2011-P-0675-0006.  As of publication, the petition remains 
pending before the FDA.  Public Citizen explained that amending the regulations to allow 
generics to change their safety labeling unilaterally “would undo th[e] impossibility” 
preemption in Mensing and “eliminate the absurd inconsistency in common-law.” Citizen 
Petition, supra, at 8. 
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considering this approach.272  In April 2012, Senator Patrick Leahy and 
Representative Chris Van Hollen introduced legislation, the Patient Safety 
and Generic Labeling Improvement Act,273 that takes a similar approach 
through amending the Food, Drug & Cosmetic Act.  These proposals have 
been supported by the nation’s trial bar for “reinstat[ing] the ability of the 
public to bring state tort law based claims.”274 
These proposals seek to reverse Mensing by creating an exception to the 
traditional principle that generic drugs have the “same” labeling as their 
brand-name counterparts by allowing manufacturers of generic drugs to use 
the CBE process to alter their labeling prior to FDA approval.275  While this 
approach may provide uniformity in liability, questions have been raised 
about the potential impact of not requiring uniformity where it has 
traditionally mattered most:  safety labeling.  The drug approval system, 
particularly the same-labeling requirement, is designed to assure patients 
and health care professionals that generic drug products are equivalent to 
their branded counterparts.276 
Issues that would need to be fleshed out include whether allowing each 
generic manufacturer to add its own product warnings would create 
multiple and contradictory versions of safety labeling information for drugs 
deemed to be bioequivalent.  Patients and health care professionals, under 
such a scenario, would have to consider which, if any, of the product labels 
are accurate.  They also may have to consider whether a new warning 
included with a generic drug pertains to all versions of a drug or is a signal 
that there is a bioequivalence problem for that specific generic drug.  If the 
latter, the new labeling could raise into question whether the ANDA for that 
generic drug, which is based on bioequivalence, is still in effect.  The 
burden would likely fall to the FDA to assess the situation and provide 
guidance.277 
 
 272. Brief of the United States As Amicus Curiae at 15 n.2, Mutual Pharm. Co., v. 
Bartlett, No. 12-142 (U.S. Jan. 22, 2013) (“This office has been informed that FDA is 
considering a regulatory change that would allow generic manufacturers, like brand-name 
manufacturers, to change their labeling in appropriate circumstances.”). 
 273. S. 2295, 112th Cong. (2012); H.R. 4384, 112th Cong. (2012). 
 274. See Press Release, Am. Ass’n for Justice, Congressional Proposal Would Expand 
Generic Drug Manufacturers’ Duty to Warn (Apr. 18, 2012), available at http://
www.justice.org/cps/rde/justice/hs.xsl/18218.htm; Letter from Gary M. Paul, President, Am. 
Ass’n for Justice, to Div. of Dockets Mgmt., FDA (Mar. 2, 2012), available at http://
www.justice.org/cps/rde/xbcr/justice/FDA_(Comments_Supporting_Public_Citizen_
Petition_Generic_Drugs)_Feb_12.pdf. 
 275. 21 U.S.C. §§ 355(j)(2)(A)(v), 355(j)(4)(G) (2006); 21 C.F.R. § 314.94(a)(8)(iii) 
(2012). 
 276. The “FDA ‘places a very high priority [on] assuring consistency in labeling,’ so as 
‘to minimize any cause for confusion among health care professionals and consumers as well 
as to preclude a basis for lack of confidence in the equivalency of generic versus brand name 
products.’”  Brief for the United States As Amicus Curiae Supporting Respondents at 4, 
PLIVA, Inc. v. Mensing, 131 S. Ct. 2567 (Nos. 09-993, 09-1039 and 09-1501) (alterations in 
original) (quoting DIV. OF GENERIC DRUGS, FDA, POLICY AND PROCEDURE GUIDE 37 (1989)) 
(citing 57 Fed. Reg. 17,961 (1992)). 
 277. Congress and the FDA are working on a regulatory approval process for biosimilars, 
and confusion caused by any differences in labeling between innovator biologics and generic 
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In addition, some have speculated that there could be an incentive for 
manufacturers of generic drugs to overwarn against potential side effects in 
order to guard against failure-to-warn liability.278  A ripple effect could be 
created where the other manufacturers of the drug, including the brand-
name drug’s manufacturer, adopt the same overwarnings, regardless of their 
accuracy, to similarly avoid liability.  Overwarning, just like under-
warning, should be avoided because overwarning deters doctors and 
patients from trusting medicines that provide needed benefits.  
Policymakers will have to examine the impact of this proposal on the 
purpose of warnings, which is to carefully recognize a drug’s benefits and 
risks and indicate how a drug can be used in ways that maximize safety and 
effectiveness.  They also will have to assess the impact on the FDA, which 
could find itself in the crossfire, trying to sort through the various warnings. 
Creating an FDA-centric system was the subject of an article in the New 
England Journal of Medicine.279  Doctors Aaron Kesselheim, Jerry Avorn, 
and Jeremy Greene write that a “better solution” is to create a “central 
repository of information on adverse drug events” for studying “late-arising 
side effects and to assess the need for changes to drug labels.”280  This way, 
the brand-name and generic manufacturers of a drug could pool their 
collective knowledge about a drug’s adverse effects.281  Presumably, then, 
the FDA, which would be in a better position than any individual company 
to determine appropriate labeling, would be charged with approving all 
labeling changes.282 
This approach was also supported by the authors of a Regenstrief study 
for resolving discrepancies between brand-name and generic labeling.  In 
the press release accompanying the study, Dr. John Duke stated, “The 
solution to the problem of labeling inconsistency may be a centralized 
listing of drug side-effects, maintained independently of individual 
manufacturer labels.  Drug labels would simply reference this common 
repository . . . .”283  The FDA already takes on this type of role when a 
 
biosimilar drugs is of particular concern.  The FDA is the only entity that can make the 
needed judgment as to which types of safety differences trigger a meaningful difference to 
the patient, and therefore disqualify the product from being a biosimilar.  
 278. There may be little reason for generic drug manufacturers not to adopt such an 
approach, as doctors frequently do not review generic drug labels.  Instead, they often 
prescribe the branded drug based on the product labeling and their own experience, and the 
generic is substituted for the branded version at the pharmacy. 
 279. Aaron S. Kesselheim et al., Risk, Responsibility, and Generic Drugs, 367 NEW ENG. 
J. MED. 1679 (2012). 
 280. Id. at 1680. 
 281. Additionally, the authors propose a compensation system similar to the Vaccine 
Injury Compensation Program for providing compensation to those harmed by drugs. See id. 
at 1680–81. 
 282. This result could be achieved by amending 21 C.F.R. § 314.70(c)(6)(iii) to eliminate 
the ability of an NDA holder to make labeling changes through the CBE process once an 
ANDA had been approved. 
 283. Regenstrief Study Finds that Generic Drugs Often Have Incorrect Safety Labeling , 
IND. U. SCH. MED. (Dec. 13, 2012), http://communications.medicine.iu.edu/newsroom/
stories/2012/regenstrief-study-finds-that-generic-drugs-often-have-incorrect-/. 
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brand-name manufacturer leaves the market and withdraws its NDA.284  
Reforms seeking to achieve these goals should also include measures to 
assure that the FDA is not improperly burdened by this responsibility. 
In exploring this approach, consideration should be given to whether the 
current emphasis on the NDA holder’s safety labeling obligations still 
reflects the way safety information is typically discovered, collected, or 
evaluated once generics enter the market, as well as the overwhelming 
command generic drugs have over the market.  The reliance on the NDA 
holder and the CBE process was designed for the first few years after a drug 
had been approved, where safety information is accumulated primarily 
through clinical studies or other controlled postmarketing research 
performed by the NDA holder.285  These dynamics change once a drug has 
been on the market for several years and becomes multisourced.  As the 
FDA has observed, “new information about drugs in long use (as generic 
drugs typically are) appears infrequently.”286  Also, safety information 
comes largely from spontaneous adverse event reports from each 
manufacturer, which can require extensive evaluation before drawing safety 
conclusions. 
Highly regarded product liability lawyer, Jim Beck, has suggested a 
hybrid system, where the FDA governs a centralized system for labeling 
multisourced drugs, but both the brand-name and generic drug 
manufacturers have the authority to unilaterally change product labeling 
through the CBE process when a manufacturer becomes aware that there is 
a heightened risk of permanent physical injury or death.287 
None of these ideas would impact a brand-name manufacturer’s 
obligations during the period in which it is the sole provider of a drug.288  
They all, however, deserve careful evaluation.  Rewriting the federal 
regulatory regime for prescription drugs is a serious undertaking that will 
have a significant impact on America’s health care. 
 
 284. See supra notes 75–78 and accompanying text.  Under current law, brand-name 
manufacturers sometimes have an incentive to withdraw their NDAs to limit their failure-to-
warn liability.  These reforms could change the dynamics and encourage companies that 
invent drugs to continue safety monitoring after generic manufacturers dominate the drug’s 
market. 
 285. See supra note 58 and accompanying text. 
 286. See Brief for the United States As Amicus Curiae Supporting Respondents at 35, 
PLIVA, Inc. v. Mensing, 131 S. Ct. 2567 (Nos. 09-993, 09-1039 and 09-1501). 
 287. See James M. Beck, One Shoe Drops, DRUG & DEVICE L. (Sept. 2, 2011), http://
druganddevicelaw.blogspot.com/2011/09/one-shoe-drops.html. 
 288. An area where these theories can be further developed and tested is with biosimilars, 
which are generic versions of biologic drugs. See Biosimilars, FDA, http://www.fda.gov/
Drugs/DevelopmentApprovalProcess/HowDrugsareDevelopedandApproved/ApprovalAppli
cations/TherapeuticBiologicApplications/Biosimilars/default.htm (last updated July 10, 
2012).  The laws and regulations for testing and marketing biosimilars are currently being 
established, and these concepts can add some certainty. 
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CONCLUSION 
It is a bedrock principle of product liability and tort law that a product 
manufacturer is subject to liability only for harms caused by its products.289  
The federal regulatory regime for prescription drugs does not change this 
basic truth.  The fact that federal law allows a company that makes generic 
drugs to use an innovator’s product and labeling to compete against that 
innovator does not mean that the innovator must also assume its generic 
competitor’s liability.  In this regard, manufacturers of prescription drugs 
are no differently situated than any other business competitors, whether in 
the restaurant, auto, or other industries.  As detailed in this Article, there are 
two decades of cases from all around the country rejecting competitor 
liability theories for prescription drugs and reinforcing these fundamental 
principles of law. 
The Supreme Court’s decision in Mensing that federal drug law preempts 
state failure-to-warn claims against manufacturers of generic drugs has no 
impact on competitor liability.  The issues are completely separate.  Courts 
may be frustrated by the disparate liability treatment for users of brand-
name and generic drugs, but they should not be tempted to radically alter 
tort law in search of defendants that users of generic drugs can sue.  As the 
Supreme Court stated in Mensing, Congress and the FDA are the 
appropriate arms of government for fashioning a response to Mensing, 
should they decide reform is needed.290  This debate is well under way. 
 
 289. See, e.g., supra note 130. 
 290. PLIVA, Inc. v. Mensing, 131 S. Ct. 2567, 2582 (2011). 
